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Abstract   
 
This dissertation utilizes a descriptive case study method to provide a comprehensive and critical 
analysis of identity politics in Rwanda. More specifically, this thesis situates identity politics in 
nation building in post-genocide Rwanda. In order to do so, this study examines diaspora 
engagement politics.  
The central question in this thesis is: In what ways, and to what extent, have identity politics 
affected the nation building project in post-genocide Rwanda, in relation to its diaspora?  
Rwanda’s turbulent history raises many issues regarding the political and social construction of 
Rwandan identity, but scholarship has not thoroughly examined the diaspora and state 
engagement with the diaspora.  This thesis sought to examine these dynamics. It will do so by 
examining: (1) the ways in which the Rwandan Patriotic Front reconfigured identities inside 
Rwanda by perpetuating the narrative of unity; (2) the collective identities ascribed to groups of 
citizens inside and outside Rwanda, based on this government narrative; (3) how the RPF 
governed perceptions abroad; and finally (4) the education programs to shape the ideal Rwandan 
citizen.  
This thesis concludes that the Rwandan government, while trying to rebuild the nation, has failed 
to transcend divisive identities that have pervaded in Rwanda. Instead, it has created a tightly 
controlled political space in which a restrictive single identity and narrative existed; furthermore, 
identity politics have been increasingly manipulated and controlled by the state apparatus. The 
state’s engagement with its diaspora illustrates this.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
The post –genocide Rwandan context is “extraordinarily complex,” as Rwandan scholar Gerard 
Prunier described.1 One cannot begin to understand the dynamics of Rwanda’s political and 
social realities after its devastating 1994 genocide without examining identity politics. As 
historian Newbury observed: “Being Rwandan is only one level of identity among others.”2 In 
Rwanda, the most historically salient causes of intergroup conflict are disputes over identity and 
citizenship, and these have been linked to mobility. There has been a complexity of relations 
between mobility and state formation in Rwanda.3 However, identity in Rwanda is much more 
complex than a “uni-dimensional Hutu-Tutsi duality.”4   
Suzanne Buckley-zistal says: “Struggles about citizenship have been central to violent conflicts 
in Africa for some time.”5 In the case of Rwanda, the “struggle for citizenship” alludes to the 
impact of mobility in Rwanda; it is historically rooted and is part of how identity politics form. 
Clashing perceptions of between the government and its people on group identity have 
significantly problematic implications for nation building and reconciliation efforts in post-
genocide Rwanda.  
Moreover, a defining element of the country’s government, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 
was that it was a government “born out of diasporic return”6 as it entered Rwanda and took 
control of the capital in 1994 and effectively ended the genocide. Thus, identities based on 
shared lived experiences linked to mobility are crucial to understanding identity based politics in 
Rwanda in its post-genocide transition. Mass displacement of people has been historically 
significant in Rwanda. Rwanda has a history of violent conflict that has led to mass exodus of 
people leaving Rwanda to neighboring countries, thus forming diaspora communities. Rwanda’s 
                                                          
1  Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1995). 
2 David Newbury, “Returning Refugees: Four Historical Patterns of ‘Coming Home’ to Rwanda.” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 47, no. 2 (2005): 284. 
3 Simon Turner, “Victims, Saviors and Suspects: Channeling Mobility in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” in Mobility 
Makes States: Migration and Power in Africa, eds. Joel Quirk & Darshan Vigneswaran (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 103. 
4 Andrea Purdekova, “Beyond De-Ethnicisation in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Deconstruction of Identity Discourse, 
Reconstruction of a Political Community.” Department of International Development, Oxford University, (2010): 2.  
5 Susanne Buckley-zistal, “Dividing and Uniting: The Use of Citizenships Discourses in Conflict and Reconciliation 
in Rwanda.” Global Society 20, no. 1 (2006): 132. 
6 Turner, “Victims, Saviors and Suspects,” 79. 
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diasporic events were so tumultuous and prominent and had huge implications: Mamdani called 
Rwanda’s diaspora “the most volatile of all diasporic networks in the region.”7 
Identity is key to understanding post-genocide politics, but must be looked at holistically by 
taking into account the diaspora nature of identity formation. Identity goes beyond ethnicities, as 
much of the literature on Rwanda seems to singularly suggest. Instead, Rwandans have diverse 
self-identities reflected through their very different experiences of the genocide. These diverse 
experiences were based on differences in identity which included both self-identity and state-
defined identity. Most notably, identity in Rwanda was not only defined by ethnic categories. 
Purdekova instead described identity in post-genocide Rwanda not only as “victim and 
participant, but also bystander, absentee or savior.”8 As this paper will show, none of these 
completely fit ethnic categories. 
Purdkeova, writing on de-ethnicization in Rwanda, noted that Rwanda is not simply a “country 
of Hutus and Tutsis…The diversity and the dividing and connecting lines have always been more 
complex, and they have been changing over time. They are perhaps even more complex today 
after the genocide and the vast post-genocide returns from multiple countries of exile.”9 This 
relationship to home and the shared lived experience of being a part of the Rwandan diaspora 
have important implications in post-genocide Rwanda.  
It is thus necessary to explore the strong societal division that still exist in Rwanda post-genocide, 
and while attention has been given to repatriation and returnees from diaspora, identity politics 
must be examined in the context of the bigger picture, in terms of the relationship between the 
state and diaspora. By examining this relationship, we can see the extent to which identity 
politics has transcended the pre and post-genocide period, and examine their role in building a 
united Rwanda. Thus, the RPF’s diaspora politics, as well as its diaspora identities, are key to 
understanding the political nature of post-genocide Rwanda.  
 
                                                          
7 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001) 
8 Purdekova, “Beyond De-Ethnicisation,” 10. 
9 Ibid., 6. 
6 
 
1.1 Research Question 
 
In what ways, and to what extent, have identity politics affected the nation building project in 
post-genocide Rwanda, in relation to its diaspora?  
Supporting Questions:  
1. What explains the nature of the RPF’s engagements with the diaspora in post-genocide 
Rwanda? 
2. In what ways has the government sought to rebuild the nation after genocide, in respects 
to its state-diaspora relations? 
3. What role does the diaspora play in post-genocide Rwanda? 
4. How has the Rwandan government engaged with the diapsora?  
5. What can the state’s engagement with its diaspora tell us about reconciliation in Rwanda?  
6. To what extent are identity politics still relevant in post-genocide Rwanda?  
 
1.2 Method  
 
This thesis is a comprehensive and critical analysis of the nature of identity politics in Rwanda. I 
employ a case study method, drawing upon Robert Yin’s conceptualization of a case study and 
its value. Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”10 Thus in the case of Rwanda, this method is 
useful in analyzing the complexity of the single case. 
More specifically, I use a descriptive case study method. While a disadvantage of a case study is 
that it does not build on theory, its value is that this method allows me to contribute to a deeper 
understanding of nation building in Rwanda. It is mostly a descriptive analysis because I seek to 
capture the complexities of Rwanda’s post-genocide identity politics by analyzing the “what” 
                                                          
10 Robert Yin. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2003), 
13. 
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and “how” questions. A descriptive case study is useful because it provides flexibility in the way 
that I explore a case that has not been extensively researched by others in the field. In this sense, 
I employ this method through my interpretation of reframing Rwanda’s nation building process 
through the context of diaspora politics.  
Thus, an important value of a case study is through its research method; I will seek to capture the 
complexities of the post-genocide nation building in Rwanda by relying on multiple sources to 
provide a well-rounded analysis. For this thesis I draw from variety of sources, including works 
by other scholars, speeches from policy-makers, government documents, and other government 
sources to critically examine identity politics in Rwanda. 
The goal of this case study is not to support or disprove a theory, nor is it to provide the basis for 
a generalization. Instead, the goal is to contribute to a wider and deeper understanding of the case 
as it can be intensively examined in order to reach conclusions given an extensive analysis of 
post-genocide nation governance in Rwanda. 
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Chapter 2: Analysis of Existing Literature on the Rwandan Nation, Identity, and Diaspora 
 
A literature review of Rwanda’s post-genocide politics shows that this is a vast and extensive 
topic for genocide and Rwandan scholars. Many scholars have examined post-genocide politics 
in Rwanda, focusing on different aspects of the genocide, analyzing the government’s role in 
post-genocide rebuilding and reconciliation. Many scholars have been very critical of the 
government’s policies and actions, questioning its implications for lasting reconciliation.11 While 
there is a lot of scholarship on post-genocide governance, and identity politics, only in recent 
years have more scholars looked at mobility linked with politics and the Rwandan diaspora 
specifically.  
 
One concept that some scholars have identified is how the government had represented itself as a 
post-genocide government. Related to this are the politics of representation, truth telling, 
political labeling, and victimhood. These are prevalent themes that are common in literature 
analyzing Rwanda’s post-genocide politics.  
A key aspect of post-genocide Rwandan governance is what Johan Pottier describes as 
“essentialist labeling”.12 Pottier stipulates that inside Rwanda, there is the “tendency to substitute 
collective guilt for personal responsibility.” Certain labels are prescribed to the Hutu community 
as a group. This, Pottier argues, is a “prime ingredient in the perpetuation of violence throughout 
the Great Lakes.” In his book Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in 
the Late Twentieth Century, Pottier examined the government narrative and how it is represented 
and misrepresented by others, particularly in terms of labeling refugees. This discourse on 
ethnicity reinforced a notion of collective guilt, which has proven to be very problematic, 
particularly in the international aid effort.  The state’s relation to the diaspora has been included 
in this literature on political identities, but only to a limited extent. Some studies focus on the 
development aspect of the Rwandan diaspora, or of the refugee crisis in the post-genocide years.  
                                                          
11 Filip Reyntjens. “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship,” African Affairs 103, no. 411 (2004): 3; 
Helen Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” Ethnicities 8, no. 1 (2008); Prunier, The Rwanda 
Crisis. 
12 Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
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Identity politics is a prominent topic amongst the literature on Rwanda, most often as a key to 
understanding and explaining the horrific genocide of 1994. Mahmood Mamdani is a leading 
scholar of Rwandan identities. Mamdani’s influential work, When Victims Become Killers 
defines the “crisis of postcolonial citizenships. He questions: why and how was Hutu made into a 
native identity and Tutsi into a settler identity?”13 Mamdani shows that the discourse of native 
and settler did not stop with the end of colonialism and explains how the genocide of 1994 came 
to happen. His work is a significant contribution to understanding political identity and 
citizenship discourse in Rwanda. 
In analyzing the Rwandan government’s post-genocide politics, scholars have also looked at 
political labeling and how that plays into identity politics. Historian Jennie Burnet14 critiques the 
national government’s role in promoting “national unity,” by enacting different policies. She 
discusses the role of political labeling and representation of “victims” and “perpetrators” in post-
genocide Rwanda. Burnet argues that ethnicity still played a role in the “policing of 
identity.”15She also discusses “politicizing victimhood,” arguing that in post-genocide Rwanda, 
certain terms like “survivors” are classified with Tutsis. Thus, she argues that the government 
has instrumentalized the genocide to justify its own political power. Furthermore, the 
government does not allow open discussions about ethnicity, and there is still an “amplified 
silence” that furthers the problem.   
Helen Hintjens also discusses this concept of the Rwandan government’s political labeling and 
discusses this concept in the context of the Rwandan diaspora and more specifically, identity 
politics. In her article “Reconstructing Political Identities in Rwanda,” she questions whether 
Rwandans are now freer to choose their political identities than they were before the 1994 
genocide,” and argue they might not be. Labels like “old caseload refugees” and “new caseload 
refugees” can be a misleading way to label entire groups of people”16Furthermore, she examines 
whether or not the transitional Government of National Unity has been able to reconstruct 
                                                          
13 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 19. 
14 Jennie Burnet, “Whose Genocide? Whose Truth?: Representations of Victim and Perpetrator in Rwanda.” In 
Genocide: Truth, Memory, and Representation, edited by Alexander Laban Hinton and Kevin Lewis O’Neill, 81-
111. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2009.  
15 Ibid., 86. 
16 Helen Hintjens, “Reconstructing Political Identities in Rwanda,” in After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, edited by Phil Clark and Z. Kaufman, 105 – 127. 
London: Hurst & Company, 2009, 80.  
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Rwandan political identities along non-racial lines a decade and a half after the genocide,” 
arguing that race labels have been reconstructed and reinterpreted by the government. She does 
this in the context of the stories of three Rwandan exiles, arguing that Rwanda’s political 
identities are still restricted by genocidal identities.   
Similarly, Cori Wielenga also discusses identity politics in the context of nation building. 17 She 
argues that the focus of identity politics in Rwanda today is replacing ethnic identity with civic 
identity, and creating a united Rwandan identity for nation building. Wielenga’s argument, based 
on months of field work in Rwanda, is that identity politics in Rwanda continue to revolve 
around ethnicity. Furthermore, she argues that in reality, lived identities of Rwandans are much 
more complex than a simplistic dual-ethnic mode of identity. 
 
Related to diaspora identity politics are concepts of citizenship discourse. Susanne Buckley-
Zistal18 and Kelly O’Connor19  both look at how the government has utilized citizenship 
discourse in Rwanda and its implications for reconciliation. O’Connor examines repatriation 
efforts in Rwanda, and argues that the “ideal citizen” portrayed by Rwandan state discourse 
“places more emphasis on national belonging and obligations…rather than rightful demands on 
the state”20 Similarly, Buckley-zistal observes that the Rwandan government used citizenship 
discourse to create national unity, yet while there may be unity in Rwanda, there is no 
reconciliation. 
 
Finally, few scholars have specifically focused on the state’s engagement with the Rwandan 
diaspora. Reiko Shindo 21 assesses diaspora return programs, exploring their role in the 
development aspect of Rwanda and looks at their implications for the post genocide Rwandan 
context.  She argues that diaspora policies are reflective of the post-conflict situation in Rwanda, 
and that diaspora return program is a part of the government’s “national project,” thus the 
diaspora plays an important role for the government, especially in terms of national development.  
                                                          
17 Cori Wielenga, ‘“Lived’ Identities in Rwanda – Beyond Ethnicity?” African Insight 44, no.1 (2014):122-136.  
18 Buckley-zistal, “Dividing and Uniting.” 
19 Kelly O’Connor, “Repatriation: The Politics of (Re)-constructing and Contesting Rwandan Citizenship.” Refugee 
Studies Centre Working Paper Series, no. 92, University of Oxford (2013).  
20 Ibid. 
21 Reiko Shindo,“The Hidden Effect of Diaspora Returns to Post-Conflict Countries,” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 
9 (2012): 1685-1702. 
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Similar to Shindo, Simon Turner is critical of the government’s relations with the diaspora, 
arguing that the government is “staging” its relations with the diaspora to show a narrative that is 
part of Rwanda’s nation building project. 22 He argues that this comes to serve certain purposes, 
like attracting resources, bringing members of the diaspora “under closer control,” and 
“performing and hence creating the state itself.”23 He notes that engaging with the diaspora is a 
central part of post-genocide state building.  
Moreover, Turner’s subsequent work illustrates how the narrative in post-genocide Rwanda is 
that the government made categories based on citizens as victims, saviors, and suspects, in the 
sense that it tries to “govern mobility” in Rwanda. He concludes that “statecraft is about 
controlling borders” but this created “insiders, outsiders, and leftovers.”24 Turner’s work 
provides an excellent framework from which to build my own research on diaspora politics. 
While he look at how the government has three categories of citizens and links this with 
identities of mobility, I will build on this to offer a more comprehensive understanding of state 
practice and discourse in Rwanda.  
While such scholars have explored critical concepts for understanding political identities in 
Rwanda, the topic has not been holistically and thoroughly explored in the context of diaspora 
relations, such as the changing nature of state-diaspora engagement in fitting with the changing 
political context. While identity politics in Rwanda has been explored, this thesis will examine 
identity politics it in the context of diaspora politics.  
I draw upon the work of Mamdani, Hintjens, and Wielenga to navigate the discourse of political 
identities in post-genocide Rwanda. Their works provide substantial contributions to 
understanding how identities have been politicized and linked with state discourse. I will draw 
upon these conceptualizations to reinterpret them in the context of the Rwandan diaspora. Thus, 
this thesis will examine the role of identity politics throughout Rwanda’s diaspora and 
problematize these identities. The objective of my paper is to provide a nuanced understanding 
of the RPF’s nation building project, in the context with the Rwandan diaspora.  
  
                                                          
22 Simon Turner, “Staging the Rwanda Diaspora: The Politics of Performance” African Studies 72:2 (2013), 266. 
23 Ibid., 268. 
24  Turner, “Victims, Saviors and Suspects,” 79. 
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Chapter 3: Analytical Framework  
 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework from which the discussions in this thesis are 
based, by defining and conceptualizing key concepts including: nation, identity, and citizen. The 
chapter situates these terms in the context of diaspora studies in Rwanda, and explains why the 
Rwandan diaspora is a useful and relevant framework for this case study on nation building in 
Rwanda  
3.1 Reconceptualizing Diaspora Studies in Rwanda 
 
This analytical framework aims to guide and contextualize concepts that link with diaspora 
studies, such as “nation”, “identity,” and “citizenship. For this case study on the Rwandan 
government’s nation building politics and governance, an examination of the diaspora ties in 
many related and relevant themes to nation building and identity politics in Rwanda. Malkki, an 
anthropologist who studied Hutu exile narratives, described:  
 
  Involuntary or forced movements of people are always only one aspect of much larger  
  constellations of sociopolitical and cultural processes and practices. Nationalism and  
  racism, xenophobia and immigration policies, state practices of violence and war,  
  censorship and silencing, human rights and challenges to state sovereignty,  
  "development" discourse and humanitarian interventions, citizenship and cultural or  
  religious identities, travel and diaspora, and memory and historicity are just some of the  
  issues and practices that generate the inescapably relevant context of human displacement  
  today.25  
 
In Rwanda, its diaspora history has a key role in shaping identities, discourse on citizenship, 
nationalism, and state politics. The post genocide state itself is one born out of diasporic return of 
a Tutsi elite, and the contemporary government continues to engage with the diaspora abroad and 
returning diaspora members. In general, all these processes have been managed in the context of 
state power and the state agenda. Most significantly, diaspora processes have played a key role in 
                                                          
25 Liisa Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of Things,” Annual Review of 
Anthropology 24 (1995): 496. 
13 
 
the Rwandan government’s post-genocide nation building agenda. Diaspora studies are 
inherently linked to a conception of the nation state, power based on territory, and distribution of 
rights through the concept of citizenship, as we shall see in the rest of this chapter.26  First, a 
basic conceptualization of diaspora is necessary.   
 
 
3.1 1 Defining Diaspora  
What is meant by the term “Diaspora?” The term “diaspora” comes from the Greek word that 
means “to sow” or “to disperse.”27 This meaning, and its connotations, has changed over time. 
Diaspora studies have typically referred to the classical use of the term, the study of the Jewish 
experience. Then, in the 1980s, “diaspora” came to describe many different categories of people 
that included: expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and 
ethnic/racial minorities.”28  Thus, the term diaspora has become an all-purpose term of various 
modes of population dispersal. 29 
Diaspora communities are formed from people migrating from a certain country, for a multitude 
of reasons under various circumstances. It can be because of conflict, poverty, natural disasters, 
or finding economic opportunities abroad.  These reasons do not, however, automatically lead to 
diaspora community formation. For the purpose of discussion on the Rwandan diaspora, a key 
feature that determines a “diaspora community” is that the people of the diaspora retain some 
sort of attachment to their home country, regardless of the time they spent outside of that 
country.30 
I draw upon Robin Cohen’s conceptualization of diaspora. Cohen, a scholar on global diasporas, 
utilizes William Safran’s definition of diaspora. Safran’s work was one of the most influential 
and marked the beginning of contemporary diaspora studies. Safran uses the following as 
concepts of a diaspora, applied to members that share some of the following features to specific 
                                                          
26 O’Connor, “Repatriation,” 3. 
27 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2008), xiv. 
28 Ibid.,1. 
29 Luxshi Vimalarajah and R.Cheran, “Empowering Diasporas: The Dynamics of Post-war Transnational Tamil 
Politics,” Berghof Occasional Paper, no. 31 (2010), 10. 
30 Huma Haider, “Transnational Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: The Participation of Conflict-generated 
Diasporas in Addressing the Legacies of Mass Violence,” Journal of Refugee Studies 27, no. 2 (2014): 3.  
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characteristics that define a diaspora:  
 
• They retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original 
homeland including its location, history and achievements; 
• They believe they are not – and perhaps can never be – fully accepted in their host societies 
and so remain partly separate; 
• Their ancestral home is idealized and it is thought that, when conditions are favourable, either 
they, or their descendants should return; 
• They believe all members of the diaspora should be committed to the maintenance or 
restoration of the original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and• they continue in 
various ways to relate to that homeland and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity 
are in an important way defined by the existence of such a relationship. 31  
Moreover, a key distinction made for migration and diaspora formation is whether or not it is 
“voluntary” or “forced” migration.32 As Cohen argued on talking about collective trauma to a 
group, there is a stark difference: “Being shackled in manacles, being expelled by a tyrannical 
leader, or being coerced to leave by force of arms, mass riots or the threat of ‘ethnic cleansing’” 
is very different than leaving a country because of “general pressures of over-population, land 
hunger, poverty or a generally unsympathetic political environment.”33 Thus, Cohen 
differentiates a victim diaspora, which has the key characteristic of the displaced people moving 
because they, or their ancestors, left a traumatic event in their homeland.34  
 
Victim Diaspora  
A “victim diaspora,” or a “conflict-generated” diaspora is not only characterized by the fact that 
people left their home because of a traumatic event, but also that the memory of their homeland 
is still important to them and salient in the collective memory of the diaspora.35 Moreover, 
conflict-generated diaspora communities often have significant roles in their homeland’s conflict. 
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In the context of Rwanda, we will later see how the origins of the RPF and its distinct ideology 
and consciousness were rooted in “conflict –generated” diasporic origins.36 
Thus, specified definitions and concepts associated with “conflict-generated” diaspora is 
particularly useful for the study of Rwanda, whose history of mass displacement has been largely 
due to traumatic, violent upheavals of communities. Rwanda’s diaspora is very heterogeneous 
and makes up the group has changed with time, place, and political space. To understand the 
current state of Rwanda’s diasporic relationships, the country must be situated in its historical 
context, which also links with diaspora identity origins. 
For the purpose of this paper, it is also important to note that diasporas are historical and political 
formations that are constructed at a specific point in time; their characteristics can change, and 
can definitely do so in political spaces. Thus, in the context of Rwanda’s nation building, 
diaspora identities come to have varied meanings, which the rest of this paper will explore 
 
3.2 Conceptualizing the “Nation” 
 
Conceptualizing the term “nation” is essential when analyzing a government’s nation building 
process. There is a vast amount of literature that has sought to define the concept of a “nation” 
and “nationality.” For the purpose of this thesis, Benedict Anderson’s notion of an “imagined 
community” will be used to conceptualize the “nation.” Anderson, in his notable work Imagined 
Communities, argues that the nation is an imagined politically community, and “is imagined 
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”37  
Moreover, Anderson describes “nationness” or “nationalism” as a form of consciousness that 
comes from specific circumstances and local, historically specific struggles. Moreover, 
nationalism is “not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness…it invents a nation where 
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Working Paper. Fairfax, Virginia: Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2004.  
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they do not exist.”38 For those living in diaspora communities and who have lived for years 
outside their state of origin, this concept is especially relevant. Furthermore, Malkki adds to 
Anderson’s characteristics of a nation and argues that it is not just that but nationalism is also 
consciously acknowledging its relation to other nation states.39  
The relationship between nation states and diasporas is quite complex. For this study, I draw 
upon Haddad’s study of refugees and their role on forming national identities. Haddad uses the 
following conceptualization of the refugee in relation to the nation state: “Refugees act to 
reinforce the imagined construct of the nation-state by forming the ‘other’, the ‘outsider’ in 
relation to whom the identity of the nation and its citizens can be perpetuated….As nation-states 
are constructed, so the refugee is also constructed and the two concepts in some sense reinforce 
each other. Imagined national identities were only able to take hold by the simultaneous 
imagining of the ‘other’, and in many cases this ‘other’ has been the refugee.”40  
 
This conceptualization is not limited to refugees only. Citizens of a country who move beyond its 
national borders, in the discourse of citizenship and belonging, pose a challenge to the notion of 
the nation state. In Rwanda’s case, this is evident in the government’s need to manage its citizens 
from afar, to control its ‘problematic’ diaspora, as I will examine later. This conceptualization 
will help us understand the dynamics of the diaspora, along with other key concepts like “citizen.” 
3.2.1 Defining Citizen   
 
The concept of a citizen is inherently linked to the concept of a nation. The politics of citizenship 
is key to an understanding of Rwanda’s history and contemporary state, and its diasporic 
characteristics. For the purposes of this paper, the idea of constructing a citizen, and its relation 
to state power, is particularly useful. I draw upon Foucault’s concept of governmentality to 
examine the power relations inherent in nation-building and citizen formation. Foucault argues 
that the citizen of the state becomes the subject that submits to the political regime, which are 
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“power-knowledge networks of discourses.”41 Thus the citizen becomes subject to the social, 
political and economic system of the nation state. Foucault’s theory highlights the power 
dynamics involved with the nation-citizen dichotomy. 
Furthermore, I conceptualize a citizen as it links to concepts of membership and belonging (and 
not belonging) to a state.  I utilize Haddad’s conceptualization:  
 
  Nationality and citizenship could not have taken such a strong hold on members of each   
  political space without the simultaneous invention of the foreigner: ‘henceforth citizen  
  and foreigner would be correlative, mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories….In other  
  words the ‘citizen’ could not have emerged without the surfacing of the ‘foreigner’ at the  
  same time: the creation of the identity of the foreigner was vital in establishing the  
  citizen-nation-state hierarchy.42 
Mamdani referred to the Rwandan genocide as a “testimony to the crisis of citizenship in 
postcolonial Africa.”43 Moreover, in his landmark study on Rwanda’s citizenship and political 
identities, Mamdani argued that “the internal pressure in Rwanda is now joined to a regional 
dynamic as two diasporas – one Hutu, the other Tutsi-confront each other in a life-and-death 
encounter. Both diasporas are animated, not simply by the cycle of revenge in Rwanda but also 
by the common regional inheritance that has been translated into a mode of citizenship that 
denies full citizenship to residents it brands as ethnic strangers.”44 Thus, understanding political 
identities must be situated in the nation-state context, as well as in the modes of “insiders and 
outsiders.”  These concepts of “belonging” set the stage for understanding diaspora identities, 
further complicating the dynamics of a diaspora. Citizenship discourse in Rwanda has been a 
recurring theme throughout Rwanda’s history, including during decolonization, genocide 
propaganda, and finally post-genocide.45  
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3.2.2 Defining Identity 
 
Finally, at the core of this thesis is the concept of identity, which links together all the 
aforementioned concepts. Identity is central to understanding post-genocide politics in Rwanda. 
Though many scholars have discussed and argued on the prevailing power of ethnicity as the key 
identifier in Rwanda, it is suffice to say that the simplistic dichotomy of Hutu or Tutsi is no 
longer reflective of identities in Rwanda.46 Instead, I emphasize the following concepts because 
it is useful for this thesis to understand the process of constructing, managing, and politicizing 
identity from a state power dynamic. 
Identity construction refers to the process of “making people” who have a sense of belonging. It 
is a “productive” concept, always shifting in different contexts and reflects common lived and 
historical experiences.47  With regard to diaspora identities specifically, Stuart Hall, a scholar on 
identity politics amid diaspora, migration and transnationalism qualifies that “diaspora identities 
are not confined to the nation state, but inherently hybrid in character.”48 He states that “diaspora 
identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through 
transformation and difference.”49 Furthermore, diasporic identity is also characterized by a 
shared history and common history, but identities fundamentally are given to “differentiate [the] 
ways people are positioned and how they are positioned within the narratives of the past.”50 
For this study, the notion of identity is key in the context of the diaspora because movement of 
people in and out of Rwanda, coupled with the highly politicized nation building project, make 
for a very complicated and dynamic relationship. Because identities are fluid and complex, they 
rarely operate solely through one type of identity.51 The case of Rwanda exhibits this, as 
identities in Rwanda are shaped by ethnicity, lived experiences, territory, class, and a myriad of 
others characteristics 
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Adamson describes this dynamic relationship:  
 
The institutionalizing of links between a state and its diaspora leads to a change in both  
the discourses and practices that define membership and belonging in the state. National 
identity remains salient and is still linked symbolically to a specific territory, but the 
practices, strategies and policies by which state elites link identity and territory are 
themselves transnational and deterritorialized.52 
 
Thus, the changing relationship between the state and its diaspora is critical to understanding 
how these identities became politicized in Rwanda. This thesis links identity to these concepts by 
addressing how the diverse lived experiences affected Rwandans’ self-identity. The concepts of 
“nation” and “citizen” become linked to identity through experiences that define who is a citizen 
in the “new” Rwandan nation, and who is not. This thesis also explores the relationship between 
self-identity and state-defined identity, as many instances show that there a disconnect between 
the state and citizen. The implications of these differences are evident in how policy-makers 
came to politicize these identities.  
 
Examining how the concept of identity is linked to these terms is helpful for the discussion on 
diaspora politics and nation building in Rwanda because it provides a framework for interpreting 
the dynamic state-citizen and citizen-citizen relationships, which will be discussed Chapter Six 
as I examine the RPF’s strategy for recategorizing political identities. In order to understand their 
strategy, I will first provide a historical overview of Rwanda’s diaspora, as well as RPF origins.   
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Chapter 4: Historical Overview 
 
This chapter provides a brief historical overview of important dimensions in Rwanda’s history 
that are useful for understanding contemporary Rwandan politics. This chapter has two aims: 
first, to provide an overview of identity politics and diaspora dynamics in Rwanda and second, to 
situate the origins of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in this context. In doing so, this chapter 
illustrates how identities and histories of mobilities have always been salient in Rwanda, and is 
still relevant in post-genocide politics.  
4.1 Historical Dimensions of the Rwandan Diaspora  
4.1.1 Rwanda’s History of Mobility and Mass Displacement  
 
When discussing mass displacement in Rwanda, mass movement caused from the genocide 
comes to mind. But the diasporic history of Rwanda is quite complex; people in Rwanda have 
moved frequently for varied reasons throughout Rwanda’s history. Likewise, the concept of what 
Rwandans considered “home” varied.53 Yet, “coming home”  is still significant, as historian 
David Newbury described: “a history of mobility in the region is useful for contextualizing our 
understanding of the processes involved, for the relatively recent presence of boundaries – 
defining identity in national terms – had imparted a particular character to the changing concept 
of “coming home.”54 
In precolonial Rwanda, the history of mass movement was very different than movement during 
colonization. In the 19th century, prior to the colonization period, being “Rwandan” was not 
defined by fixed geographical space only. Instead, Newbury argued it was based more on culture, 
social networks and where one could have productive labor. However, this began to change with 
the start of the colonial period in the 20th century, where being Rwandan was identified with 
geographic space and “boundaries of the colonial state.”55  
 
Rwandans who left during the early 20th century included economic migrants who sought 
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opportunities elsewhere. For example, there were at least 450,000 Rwandans who had moved to 
the Belgian Congo from the 1920s and stayed there until independence in Rwanda for economic 
opportunities. Additionally, around 700,000 Rwandans had moved to Uganda from the 1920s to 
the 1950s for economic reasons. Yet, it was the mass displacement sparked by Rwanda’s 
decolonization struggle that marked a clear shift in Rwanda’s diasporic history.56  
Many of the conflict-driven diaspora members who left Rwanda during the 1960s did not know 
that they would live in exile for almost 30 years. These people who left came to have many 
different experiences that being a “Rwandan refugee” in the Great Lakes region could mean 
many different things. While some refugees found successes while living abroad, through means 
of working and other ways, for the most part these exiled Rwandans faced precarious and 
traumatic experiences. There were “widows and families with a single female parent, lone young 
adults, people left behind in the camps, and groups in conflict situations with the local 
populations.”57 
The exiled Tutsi remained in touch with each other; they organized themselves into social clubs 
and organizations like the Rwandese Canadian Cultural Association in Ontario. These groups 
spanned all over, including: Quebec, Ontario, Belgium, Germany, Bujumura, New York, Los 
Angeles, Washington DC, Nairobi, Lome, Dakar and Brazaville. They were very diverse and 
widespread, “reflecting the diversification of the diaspora.”58 They would organize different 
events, and even published cultural and political newspapers and magazines. What was 
interesting of this context though, as Prunier argued, was that in some ways the exiled Rwandan 
Tutsis became closer than they were while living inside Rwanda. This was because in this new 
context outside of the country, some previously held social barriers did not exist.59This, I would 
argue, factors in to the formation of diaspora identities that would be formed, to be explored in 
the subsequent chapter.  
This strong sense of attachment to their home country was especially true of the exiles who were 
forced to leave in the 1950s and 1960s and remained a key characteristic in their diaspora 
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identities. Over time, the notion of an “idealized Rwanda”60 became an important part of this 
diaspora’s identity, over years of being in exile.61 As Lyons, a scholar on diaspora studies, put it: 
“The ‘old country’ is often romanticized and past glories and grievances kept alive in an 
‘allegiance to the land of memories’ as a way of asserting continued belonging.”62  After living 
in the diaspora for so many years, memories of their “home country” gradually and eventually 
turned into memories of a “mythical country.” This was particularly true for the younger children 
who grew up in exile or who left Rwanda when they were young. Because their experiences of 
living in the diaspora were quite difficult in many cases, Rwandans constructed a version of the 
home they had left behind, and Rwanda was known to be the “land of milk and honey.”63 
The Rwandans abroad held on to this strong image and it was prominent in their mindset – their 
return home. Prunier said: “They ignored the fact that their eventual return would not be as ideal; 
economic problems link with their eventual return, such as overpopulation, overgrazing or soil 
erosion, were dismissed as Kigali regime propaganda.”64 Thus, for those living in the diaspora, 
the concept of returning home remained a salient factor that motivated them to want to come 
home. This was especially true for the diaspora community in Uganda, where the biggest portion 
of people who left went to live.65 Of course, as we shall see in the next chapter, this was not the 
Rwanda home that they would return to. Nonetheless, as this shared notion of returning to the 
land of milk and honey was a key factor in setting the scene for forming a collective diasporic 
identity, particularly in Uganda, as we will see in the next chapter.    
4.1.2 A Historical Look at Identity Politics in Rwanda   
 
“Diaspora identities” emerged from the shared experiences of Rwandans forced out of their 
home country to build new lives abroad for many years in these diaspora communities. From this 
shared living experienced came a common identity based on the mutual sense of attachment and 
solidarity to the idea of their home country. Moreover, being part of a specifically conflict-
generated diaspora tends to heighten this sense of solidarity, and thus networks are formed to 
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propagate this shared identity and keep “nationalist hopes alive from abroad.” 66  In addition to 
sharing the idealized vision of their home to return to, organizing into associations and groups 
throughout the diaspora is a key indicator of this shared attachment to home. In the Rwandan 
context, diaspora and diaspora identities cannot be understood without looking at ethnicity. 
Ethnicity and race as forms of identity are dominant concepts that form Rwandan identity. The 
notions of ethnicity and race play key roles in the patterns of Rwandan’s diasporic history. It 
remains salient in the formation of diasporic identities amongst the diaspora during and after 
decolonization.  
First, let us look at genocide and the historical dimensions of ethnicity, as relevant to Rwanda, 
with a brief discussion on the definition and conceptualization of “ethnicity.” These definitions 
and explanations are contested amongst scholars. While Nigel Eltringham brings up the question 
of whether or not “ethnicity” is even a viable concept to discuss, he argues that ultimately, in 
these situations, ethnicity remains salient and the concept of ethnicity must be studied to 
understand how actors involved use this “notion of ethnic distinction.” Thus, despite the 
convoluted nature of the term ethnicity, it is highly relevant to understanding Rwanda’s complex 
social context and history, particularly for understanding the role of ethnic divisions in the 1994 
genocide. When studying the Rwandan genocide, the general consensus is that the events of 
1994 was a pre-planned, state-sponsored genocide in which the “enemy within” was defined by 
racial terms based on the Hamitic race of Tutsi.67  
When historians Catherine and David Newbury analyzed the historical relevance of ethnicity in 
Rwanda, they examined the two common views. One is based on the assumption that “ethnic 
identities have unchanging cultural and biological traits and that therefore Hutu and Tutus will 
always be opposed to each other.” The second one is that before the arrival of colonial powers, 
Rwanda was a society without ethnicities and that today’s ethnic identities were invented by 
European politics. The Newburys disagree with both views and instead observed that it is not 
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simply historical components that make ethnicity important, but how it has been used 
politically.68  
The ethnic realities of Rwanda are very complicated, but its core is rooted in politics, so it must 
be understood and examined in that space.  In the Rwandan context, Hutu and Tutsi have come 
to mean different things at different points in time in Rwanda, depending on social and political 
contexts and space. These terms have meanings that change diachronically (across time) and 
synchronically (at a point in time).69 Historically, the precolonial Rwandan kingdom was divided 
into a dozen clans, which included Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, with Hutu constituting around 84 
percent of the population. Differences between the groups were seen more so as class 
distinctions, rather than ethnic distinctions.70 They spoke the same languages, shared the same 
religion and culture. Before colonial influence, these identities were fairly flexible and fluid. The 
idea that “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were different tribes or different ethnic groups has been disputed. 
Instead, it is generally believed that the term “Tutsi” referred to those associated with power, 
while “Hutu” was a “transethnic identity of subjects.”71 Though it did not happen often, Hutu 
could “become” Tutsi, and vice versa. This was generally the case until the mid-1800s, when one 
of the last kings of Rwanda, Rwabugiri, solidified identities to consolidate the kingdom.  Until 
colonialism, clan and lineage thereafter became more important identifiers. 72 However, with 
colonization, these distinctions became highly politicized.73 These identities turned into “rigid 
ethnic or ‘racial’ interpretation of such identity groups.” 74 Under German and Belgian colonial 
masters, identity documents were given out to label whether each person was a Hutu or Tutsi.75  
During this time, the Hamitic Hypothesis also played a critical role in influencing “hardened 
ethnic boundaries.” Essentially a “racial, social and evolutionary” ideology, it classified Tutsis as 
a superior, racial class. The Hamitic Myth espoused the idea that Tutsis were the superior 
“Caucasian” race who came from north-eastern Africa and, moreover, were “responsible for 
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civilization in East and Central Africa. 76 This Hamitic myth was profound and widely believed.  
“Scholars” helped espouse these racial perceptions by legitimizing it. For example, Alexis 
Kagame was known as the “native Rwandese intellectual.”77 His works utilized, incorporated, 
and legitimized these racial ideas for explaining aristocratic Tutsi rule. Kagame’s works were 
widely read by Tutsi intellectuals. Moreover, the Hamitic myth reached the Hutu masses. Thus, 
as Eltringham argued, social distinction in colonial Rwanda was racially constructed and did not 
form to the current multidimensional understanding of ethnicity.78 These ethnic and racial 
distinctions remained salient and relevant in the development of Rwanda diaspora identity in 
Uganda.  
4.1.3 Decolonization: a Shift in Identities   
 
Decolonization was a pivotal point in Rwanda’s history, signifying a drastic shift not only in 
political structure, but in identity. As Hintjens explained, “At this time, class and ‘race’ identity 
fused into a single, exclusionary paradigm of Rwandan nationality and citizenship.” 79 During 
this transition, there was the shift from colonial ideologies of race. Simultaneously, with 
independence, movements between countries further polarized identities.80 
During the decolonization struggles in Rwanda of the late 1950s and early 1960s, thousands of 
Rwandans fled the country amidst a tumultuous political situation. From 1959 to 1964, and for 
sporadic periods after that, there was a continuous stream of Rwandan Tutsis who fled to exile 
during the so-called “Hutu Revolution.” Many emigrants fled on foot to refugee camps in 
Uganda.81 This displacement was starkly different than that of the past, as these Rwandans who 
left were “classic refugees”: they were forced to leave Rwanda for political reasons. 82 During 
this period of decolonization, refugees left in waves, as there were two stages. The first wave 
came with the “Revolution” of 1959. During this stage, the group “sought to overthrow the 
monarchy and to drive out members of the administrative class, those tied directly to the 
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implementation of colonial policy.”83 The Hutu overthrew the Tutsi ruling class, killing an 
estimated ten thousand and producing the first several exoduses following large massacres. 
Then, the second stage of the revolution occurred in 1963-1964, which started from the refugee 
community itself as they tried to fight back. Tutsi exiles, mostly young members of exiled 
families, launched attacks from abroad, but it was poorly planned. The government launched 
attacks in retaliation and repression, and around 10,000-14,000 Tutsis and Tutsi politicians living 
in Rwanda were executed. The invasions stopped as the second round of Rwandans fled the 
country.  There would be no more organized and militarized attempt to go back home until the 
formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the 1980s.84   
Thus, this was Rwanda’s first conflict-generated diaspora, the first exodus of people leaving that 
were identity-motivated, unlike the economic migrants of early mass movements. The Rwandans 
who left the country during the late 1950s and early 1960s were “classic refugees” because they 
were forced to leave Rwanda for political reasons. A key characteristic of these refugees, 
however, was that they had a strong identity with Rwanda, and they maintained this identity and 
sought to return home.85 By 1962, there were already around 120,000 refugees outside 
Rwanda.86 
The approximate number that people have come to agree on is 600,000-700,000.87  This is the 
number of refugees and children who left Rwanda because of political persecution between 1959 
and 1973 and who still identified themselves as ‘refugees’ in the 1990. 88 These communities of 
refugees in exile went to regional bordering countries like the Congo, Kenya, Burundi and 
Uganda.  
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4.2 Origins of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Uganda: Identity Politics in Exile 
4.2.1 Formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front    
 
The origins of the RPF are important to understand because it guides their ideology and 
governing methods in the post-genocide period, as I will argue. As Hall noted on diaspora 
identities: “These hybrid identities are formed through displacement, the transnational 
experiences and both the host and home countries.”89 This could not be truer for the context of 
Rwandans in Uganda, who had built their lives in a politically volatile host country. After the fall 
of Idi Amin, and Milton Obote’s second government was instated in 1981, the political climate 
remained tense and violent. 90 The Tutsi refugees living in Uganda faced political repression and 
violence in the early 1980s in Obote’s Uganda. The RPF’s roots began in this political context, 
as the Rwandan refugees in Uganda created the Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation in 1979 
to help those Rwandan refugees who had been politically repressed. In 1980, this organization 
renamed itself the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU); they became more politically 
militant and initiated discussions on returning back to Rwanda.91 
A turning point for the refugees living in Uganda occurred in 1982, with government-sponsored 
attacks on refugee camps targeting Rwandan Tutsis. Additionally, in November of that year 
Rwanda closed its borders, denying Rwandans re-entry to the country. As Newbury noted, these 
Rwandans were “neither refugees nor returnees.”92 This expulsion had significant repercussions 
throughout the refugee diaspora. Prunier described:  
 
  Many of the young men, like Paul Kagame, felt that Rwanda was an old story, their   
  parent’s story, and that they were now Ugandans. And then they suddenly discovered that  
  people among whom they had lived for thirty years were treating them as hated and  
  despised foreigners. The shock was tremendous.93  
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Eager to fight Obote’s hostile regime, Rwandans joined in when a popular resistance movement 
led by Yoweri Museveni organized to fight the Obote regime. Amongst them was Kagame, who 
would later play a critical role in the Rwandese exile political movement. Many young Rwandan 
men joined Museveni’s guerilla forces and joined in on the fighting. When Museveni’s National 
Resistance Army (NRA) took Kampala in January 1986, 3,000 of its 14,000 fighters were from 
Rwanda. After Museveni came to power, however, a gradually increasing number of Ugandans 
expressed hostility toward the Rwandan presence in the NRA regime, especially as Rwandans 
held military positions and became more involved in the economy.  Rwandans from the diaspora 
all over the world started moving to Uganda. As one woman who moved from Belgium to take a 
well-paying government job stated: “Now Uganda belongs to us.”94  
This put pressure on President Museveni, who began to feel like the government’s relations with 
the Rwandans were more of a like a liability.95 Relations between the Ugandan government and 
the Rwandan Tutsi exiles became more strained; promotions in the army stopped and promises 
of naturalization were not kept. By the end of the 1980s, almost 30 years after the first wave, the 
refugee population stood at 550,000 according to the UNHCR figures, and up to almost a million 
according to some Tutsi; 350,000 lived in Uganda alone.”96  This large population truly felt that 
their time of thirty years in exile in Uganda were over. As Van Der Meeren put it: 
  Fearing also for their own career security as stateless persons, without citizenship rights  
  and exposed to jealousy among their hosts, they took up the issue of the refugees'  
  inalienable right to repatriation and the responsibility of Rwanda to solve the problems of  
  its citizens in exile.97 
This determination had important political consequences. In 1987 RANU turned itself into the 
Rwandese Patriotic front, “an offensive political organization dedicated to the return of exiles to 
Rwanda, by force if necessary.” There was always talk amongst the Ugandan exile of someday 
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returning back to Rwanda, but it was not until this point, with the formation of the RPF, that 
there were serious and concerted efforts and a militarized component.98  
It was this context that would eventually form the beginnings of the four year civil war, launched 
in October 1990 when the RPF attacked Rwanda. The RPF and Rwandan government would 
eventually go through negotiations leading to the Arusha Accords of 1993.The Arusha Accords, 
encouraged by the international community, stipulated that there would be provisions for: a 
ceasefire, the make-up of a transitional government, a reconfiguration of the armed forces, and 
the return of refugees.”99 As we now know, the negotiations stipulated by the Accords were 
interrupted; a missile fired to President Habyarimana, killing the president, sparked the start of 
100 days of genocide.100   
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4.2.2 The RPF as a “Victim Diaspora” Understanding the RPF Identity and Ideologies   
 
Given the swift change in power in post-genocide Rwanda, the country was left in quite a 
precarious and uncertain situation while the government was struggling to rebuild the country.  
I argue that a lot of these tensions and divisiveness came from identity-based perceptions that 
permeated into politics. Exploring political identities during this transition period is key to 
understanding the RPF. First, it is necessary to explore the historical identity of the RPF. 
Purdekova argued that one reason why Rwanda poses a unique case study is because the victors 
of the war were themselves returning from exiles. This characteristic is, I would argue, a defining 
trait that is crucial to understanding the RPF’s ideology and self-identity.101 
For those elite Tutsis in power who had been in exile abroad, their historical identities associated 
with growing up in the diaspora had significant implications on their self-perceptions. These 
people saw themselves as victims, as they grew up in exile and were raised in families who were 
forced out of Rwanda because of political violence, no doubt experiencing mass trauma. Thus, a 
large part of the RPF’s ideology was a shared identity of being part of, and coming from, a 
“victim diaspora.”102 This identity plays a significant part in shaping the RPF’s narrative and 
nationalist script of rebuilding the nation. Thus Cohen’s term of a “victim diaspora” is fitting to 
describe the 1959 Tutsi diaspora.103  
Moreover, members of the RPF saw themselves as not only victims, but also as saviors who 
liberated the nation. President Kagame stressed the “hero status” of the RPF, because of its role 
in stopping the genocide when the international community stood by and did nothing.104  Many 
members of the government elite had a collective identity based on shared lived experience. This 
was especially true of the RPF elite, who had fought together from abroad and came into the 
country as the victorious party. As Phil Clark describes, the RPF’s shared experience born of the 
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diaspora “instilled a deep sense of purpose and resole, a collective identity forged through 
conflict, and an ethos of self-reliance that remains one of the RPF’s defining features.”105 
Moreover, the RPF’s experience of living in exile helped shape their ideologies and would later 
play into their post-genocide governance and polices. While living in the diaspora, the RPF was 
ideologically “Pan-Africanist” and trained its members in African politics, history and 
philosophy. Talk of ethnic identity was forbidden; instead, patriotism and unity were emphasized. 
Therefore, for the most part, RPF members saw themselves as being African first, and then 
Rwandanese, but not as “Tutsi.”106 As such, the RPF’s thoughts on nationalism and how to build 
a nation were “imported” and “brewed in exile.”107 There are important and lasting implications 
of this rhetoric, in terms of how the RPF wanted to be viewed. It guided the RPF’s governance 
and state building polices and swift consolidation of power, and was used as part of their rhetoric 
to legitimize their power in the eyes of the international community as well as their fellow 
Rwandans.   
The fact that the RPF had this shared idea of being victims themselves, and came into the 
country as saviors, is significant for two reasons. First, the RPF’s identity linked with victimhood 
was not limited to the RPF. It also spread to the people associated with them: the primarily Tutsi 
refugees from the diaspora returning from years in exile. The returnees came back to a country 
alongside the victors. Many saw the RPF as “their army” and thus shared in the RPF’s “victor’s 
attitude.”108 Second, this collective identity came to exacerbate tensions amongst the people in 
Rwanda, especially when the country had to deal with a massive amount of returnees in the years 
following the end of the genocide, further complicating the social and political landscape. The 
government’s shared identity was not something entirely welcomed by everyone, and it was a 
point of contention amid the complicated and uncertain context with the RPF’s takeover of 
power.   
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Chapter 5: Post-genocide Transition: Creating the “New Rwanda”  
 
During the immediate post-genocide period, the nation struggled to rebuild after such extreme 
violence in the wave of the devastating genocide. This chapter provides the context in which the 
RPF came to power, and the complex socio-political dynamics of the immediate post-genocide 
period when Rwandans were simultaneously leaving and entering the country. This chapter 
contextualizes the nation building project of the RPF in a post conflict state where there was a 
drastic reorganization of power, and tensions amongst groups of Rwandans. The chapter 
concludes by exploring the context in which a nation building process was much needed in 
Rwanda. 
5.1 Mass Movement in and out of Rwanda: Returnees and Exodus 
 
When the RPF finally seized the capital of Kigali in July 1994 and effectively ended the 
genocide, there was immediate mass movement of people coming in and out of the country. First, 
there was the return of Rwandans from the diaspora. 700,000 former exiles returned to the 
country. The return of these “fifty-niners”109 was very chaotic; it was the biggest recorded 
repatriation in the world.110 These “old caseload returnees” comprised of mostly Tutsi who had 
gone into exile in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and had lived in the diaspora for many years. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) referred to them as “old caseload 
refugees.”  
This massive return home would make for a tumultuous and complicated social landscape as 
people who have lived in exile either for decades, or as refugees during the genocidal warfare, 
were to enter in the country again. As Purdekova noted: “Exile can lead both to distanciation 
from homeland, and to longing and re-imagining of home and nation. All of these factors 
determine the experience of return and integration, and also might signal a most complex 
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transformation of conflict.”111 In Rwanda, the swift takeover by the RPF, after years of being in 
exile, would drastically change the makeup of the country. 
Newbury explained that these former exiles who returned at the end of the genocide returned 
“jubilantly and triumphantly” to their homeland after thirty years in exile.112 Under this premise 
of what they thought they would have when they returned home, Rwanda seemed to be a dream 
finally realized. However, the reality of the situation of their “home” was to be a surprising 
awakening. The reality of the context to which they returned “home” was terrible. It was to a 
country that had gone through “trauma beyond description.”113 After all, almost two million 
people had been killed in a hundred days.  As one survivor described returning to Kigali, “the 
place smelled of death.”114  
Not only were the exiles returning to a place where people were beyond traumatized, the actual 
landscape they returned to was beyond shattered. The capital was in ruins; there was no money 
in government, no electric phones or water lines, and dead bodies in latrines and wells. The 
hospitals were not in any working order. Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine why 
one would want to return home; as Gourevitch described: 
One might suppose that the dream of return would have lost some of its allure for the 
Tutsi of the Rwandan diaspora; that people who sat in safe homes abroad, receiving the 
news of the wholesale slaughter of their parents and siblings…would reckon their 
prospects for a natural death in exile and stay there. One might suppose that a simple 
desire to not go mad would inspire such people to renounce forever any hope of again 
calling Rwanda “home.” Instead, the exiles began rushing back to Rwanda even before 
the blood had dried. 115  
Thus for all these returning Rwandans, they returned to a home very different from what they 
had imagined.116   
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Furthermore, the exiles were returning to a country that was, to some degree, “emptied of people,” 
as many were internally displaced, or fleeing into exile simultaneously.117 In a 24 –hour period 
on April 29 1994, it was estimated that 250,000 people left Rwanda over the bridge at Rusumo 
Falls in the southeastern corner of the country. As Newbury described, the exodus in 1994 was of 
great magnitude: “this was the most abrupt, massive refugee movement of this scale ever 
known.”118 By late August of 1994 it was estimated that over two million Rwandans, mostly 
Hutus, had fled and sought refuge in neighboring countries, including: 1.2 million in Zaire, 
580,000 in Tanzania, 270,000 in Burundi and 10,000 in Uganda. But, most of the Rwandans who 
fled were fleeing not only to escape the potential for renewed violence but also out of fear of 
revenge killings with the ensuing RPF takeover. 119  
The nature of this mass exodus was starkly different than that of the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike 
that earlier refugee community, these refugees often did not have the resources or bureaucratic 
skills, and did not have regional and or international support networks.120 These refugees fled on 
foot with only the belongings they could carry, walking for weeks. In many instances they were 
separated from their family members, and many would die from hunger, epidemic disease, and 
exhaustion. They lived in refugee camps, and were often victimized by authorities of the host 
countries. These camps were highly politicized and militarized. They were treated collectively as 
a “pariah population,” clearly separate from the local people and were never absorbed into the 
local population. 121 
Moreover, divisive identities were challenging to nation building. Collective identities defined 
the government, but also reached Rwandans as well, highlighting that divisive factions continued 
to develop since 1994. As Purdekova put it: “After the genocide, Rwanda is even more diverse, 
but more importantly, differently divided than before. The pure disruptive force of genocide, the 
diverse experiences of it, the mass returns from various countries of exiles, and the changed 
power structure all point to new constituencies and new inequalities that have to be taken into 
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account.”122 These tensions were based on struggles of legitimacy and citizenship, which were 
linked to mobility-based identities. 
Rwandans held many different opinions and fears, rooted in not only historical identities but also 
diverse lived experiences, particularly that of the horrors of the genocide. Like other post conflict 
contexts, the transition period in Rwanda was very complicated and the transitional government 
faced the enormous task of rebuilding the nation. This social context must be noted as an 
important departure point for understand the nature of post genocide politics in Rwanda. 
A lot of these tensions were because of the precarious situation with more mass movement. Just 
as it was in the immediate post-genocide period, the return of thousands of Rwandans from 
abroad would again uproot and add increased tensions to the social context of Rwanda.  It was 
under this context of mass movement of Rwandans coming in and leaving that the RPF assumed 
power in Rwanda, and thus began its grand project of nation building. 
 
5.2 Consolidation of RPF Power  
 
While the end of the genocide brought back Rwandan exiles from Burundi, Congo and such 
neighboring countries, the most powerful and influential group returning was that of the exiles 
from the Ugandan diaspora. It was this group that primarily made up the RPF, whose victory of 
taking over the capital Kigali instituted a swift change in power.123  
The RPF return officially disbanded the genocide government and established the new 
transitional government, the Government of National Unity in July 1994. It sought to reaffirm 
the ideals set forth by the Arusha Accords of 1993 and resume the country’s goal of power 
sharing. 124Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu who had joined the RPF in Uganda, became the first 
president, with Paul Kagame as the vice president.  
When the RPF assumed power, it initially took certain steps to show its commitment to continue 
with what the Arusha Accords started. On July 19, the new government created the Government 
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of National Unity.125 Two political parties, the Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le 
Développement (MRND) and Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), were banned 
for their “leading role in the genocide.” The government reaffirmed its commitment to power 
sharing. As determined by the Arusha accord, a Hutu from the MDR, Faustin Twagiramungu 
became prime minister.126 The transitional government faced a mammoth task of rebuilding the 
country; there was not even a dollar or a Rwandan franc left in the treasury, as Gourevitch 
described.127 The government had to prioritize security, build an army, address much needed 
transitional justice measures -- all amidst the chaotic mass return and exile of Rwandans in and 
out of the country.128 The RPF’s control of the capital, takeover of government, and pushing out 
the genocidaires came as a great relief to many. The RPF’s victory marked the end to the horrific 
genocide. With the end of the genocide, many were relieved and expected that good governance, 
stability, democracy and peace would finally come to Rwanda.129  
Others, however, were uncertain of what would happen in the post-genocide period with the 
returning Tutsi refugees from Uganda suddenly controlling government, as they ended up 
forming the elite RPF class. Rwandans perceived this as a “Tutsification” of power.130 They 
feared there would be revenge, retribution, and “reversal of the status quo” with Tutsis now 
being in control.131 These uncertainties and tensions were understandable, given that the RPF 
quickly consolidated power. The Government of National Unity put amendments into place 
which deviated from what the Arusha Accords had originally stipulated. The RPF introduced a 
strong executive presidency, imposed dominance of the RPF in the government, and redrew the 
composition of parliament.132 Moreover, a study revealed statistics that showed how many Tutsi 
held positions of power and how many of them came from abroad:133  
 Of  Rwanda’s 12 [prefects], 7 were Tutsi and 5 returnees 
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 Of 12 commissioners on the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), 9 
were Tutsi and 4 returnees 
 Of 22 supreme court judges, 14 were Tutsi and 15 were returnees  
 Of 28 heads of state owned enterprises, 23 were Tutsi, 24 members of RPF (no figure for 
returned portion)  
 Of 15 ambassadors, 13 were RPF members, 12 were Tutsi  
 
5.3 Tensions at Home: the Need to De-ethnicize the Nation  
 
Hintjens argued that “the genocidal project was a reaction to a deep-rooted crisis of state 
legitimacy in Rwanda.”134 In the post-genocide period state, understanding perceived legitimacy 
play an important role in the nature of Rwanda politics.  While the RPF believed their status as 
victims and saviors from the diaspora legitimized their return to Rwanda as they liberated the 
country, there still existed divisive perceptions amongst Rwandans toward the government.  
The people who were forced to go into exile were also those who, prior to fleeing their country, 
were the ones who held positions of power in local government and helped implement state 
policies; they were the people who had been “beneficiaries of the colonial state”.135 Thus, when 
the political structured changed in the 1960s, many Rwandans believed that these refugees had 
simply been a “victims of structures of their own making.”136 However, the refugees themselves 
had a contrasting perception. The “old caseload refugees” did not view themselves as a part of 
the “privileged aristocracy” who had been ousted in democratic elections. Instead, the RPF saw 
themselves as victims of “colonial policy.” This is key to their group identity.137  
While the RPF self-identified with this victim label, the nature of their power in government was 
not seen as the same. Most of the men in the RPF who came to power and stayed in power were 
those who came from abroad. Most of them had never lived in Rwanda before 1990. Prunier 
observed that even if the regime did not want to consciously promote ideologies of exclusivism, 
“its very social structure and cultural strangeness embodied in Tutsi supporters coming from 
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abroad makes it an alien form of power.”138 Moreover, to the average Hutu peasant, the 
government was seen as a foreign government.139 This has huge implications for reconciliation 
prospects, especially in a country in which identity is so important. And, because of how some 
Rwandans viewed the RPF, the government sought legitimacy in the eyes of their people. 
The Rwandan Tutsis who returned home took positions in government, while the many Tutsis 
who stayed inside the country were often excluded from government.140 Thus, these returnees 
came home to a government that had not been in the country for many years, and to many this 
made them perceive the government to be foreign invaders.141Of course this is problematic 
because it brings out the problem of legitimacy; the RPF needs to be perceived as legitimately 
holding power. Historically these perceptions have been fatal to the country.  Politicizing identity 
and citizenship was used as genocide propaganda, as genocidaires spread the idea that Tutsis 
were a foreign people, so they were justified to drive them out of Rwanda.142  
Furthermore, this was not a perception held by only by Hutu citizens. One Tutsi citizen stated in 
an interview: “We survivors find it very difficult to integrate into the present society and – I hate 
to say it – into the government, too. They have their own style from outside, and they don’t have 
much trust in us either. When they came they took the country as in a conquest. They thought it 
was theirs to look after.”143 Further, another survivor reiterated the same sentiment: “They come 
here, they see us, and they say, ‘how did you survive? Did you collaborate with the Interhamwe?’ 
They think we were fools for having stayed in the country –and maybe we were- so they disdain 
us. They don’t want to be reminded. It shocks us to the bones.”144 These perceptions show that 
intergroup tensions were not singularly based on ethnicity, but on lived experiences that came to 
shape their group identity. 
Moreover, the returning diaspora members were hardly a unified group, even amongst 
themselves. One Tutsi returnee said:  “I feel close to other people like me, people who have 
returned after the war. Somehow I feel free with them, not like people who lived here before and 
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during the war. With these people, it is more difficult, they are more cautious and closed, I don’t 
know where I stand.”145 Additionally, there were tensions between the returnees and the 
Rwandans who have been in the country. For example, even the returnees of 1994 were 
suspicious of the Rwandans who had grown up in the country, both Hutu and Tutsi. They 
assumed that these Tutsi and Hutu must have collaborated in the genocide if they had survived 
the genocide.146 Moreover, returning Rwandans had to fight for resources like land.  
These tensions were because of the RPF’s swift consolidation of power as well as the RPF’s 
historic identity as “foreigners.”  When examining the roots of the RPF, their identity was shaped 
not only by ethnic distinctions, but its implications for the Rwandans belongingness in the 
country. As Mamdani argued: “The RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda was the first signal 
that the crisis of citizenship had indeed taken on a regional dimension.”147 Moreover, Mamdani 
said: “The 1990 invasion should be understood as an armed repatriation of Banyarwanda 
refugees from Uganda.” Thus, for many Hutu, the 1990 insurrection resembled more a foreign 
invasion than a liberation.  
In this sense, ethnic identity was still inextricably linked with identity; the Hamitic Myth 
remained relevant. As Susanne Buckley-zistal posited: “The significance of the invented history 
of Rwandan lies in its impact on citizenship.148 Tutsi were increasingly portrayed not merely as 
immigrants but as foreign occupants and oppressors- not unlike the colonialists.” Citizenship 
became defined by ethnic identity, linked to the idea of who belonged in and outside the country. 
This idea of Tutsi racial superiority affected this perception, and clearly transcended generations. 
These perceptions were highly problematic to the RPF. It challenged the state’s ability to 
reconcile and rebuild in the post-genocide context, and furthermore threatened the power of the 
state apparatus itself. Thus, in accordance with the narrative of national unity and reconciliation, 
reeducation of citizens was another way in which the government sought to recreate the ideal 
Rwandan identity. This, among other reasons, is a key reason for understanding why the RPF 
sought a stringent plan of de-ethnicization and creating a united post-genocide Rwandan state.   
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Chapter 6: Recreating the State and Citizen: Managing, Constructing, and Navigating 
Collective Identities In and Outside Rwanda  
 
This chapter focuses on the RPF’s nation building project, specifically exploring the ways in 
which the RPF engaged with different “parts” of the diaspora. In the new Rwanda, the key to 
nation building is defining who now lives in Rwanda, who belongs, and who makes up the ideal 
Rwandan citizen. This chapter critically interprets the ways in which the RPF engaged with the 
diaspora to build the nation. This is demonstrated in two ways, through both discourse and 
practice; that is – how the government manufactures and reinforces identity and citizenship, and 
the programs implemented.  The RPF’s engagement with both Rwandans living in the diaspora 
and those returning from it plays equally important roles in understanding the RPF’s identity 
politics. This chapter illustrates how the process of recreating the state-citizen relationship was 
politically manipulated.  
6.1 Constructing a United Rwanda  
At the end of the transition period in 2001, Rwanda was yet at “another crossroads.” As defined 
by the Arusha Accords, the transition was to end in less than a year by a constitutional 
referendum and multi-party elections, signaling that the country was successfully 
democratizing.149 As Lemarchand described it, in the post-genocide period Rwanda’s 
government had to undergo a “drastic reconfiguration of collective identities,”150 and the RPF 
chose to do so with the goal of building a nation. This was done in two ways: by building a 
united, de-ethnicized state of Rwanda, and redefining and reconfiguring what it mean to “be 
Rwandan.” Building this narrative of a united Rwanda was critical for the RPF in order for it to 
strengthen state power and create a unified state with no divisive factions to hinder this goal. The 
Rwandan diaspora played an important role in this.  
After the genocide, the RPF built upon a strict and purposeful nation building script, essential for 
the country’s huge need to rebuild after the genocide. Their goal was emphasized by the Vision 
2020, a program launched in 2000, which the government described as a reflection of Rwanda’s 
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aspirations and determination to “construct a united, democratic and inclusive Rwandan identity, 
after so many years of authoritarian and exclusivist dispensation.”151 Thus, in accordance with 
this vision, one of the priorities of the RPF was to stop divisiveness by attempting to “de-
ethnicize” the nation. This was key to building the government’s narrative of the “New Rwanda.”  
In order to rebuild a country, the RPF stressed a new type of identity, in which “being Rwandan” 
was now only associated with citizenship. This is the primary work of the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission (NURC), established in 1999, with the mandate to foster unity and 
reconciliation throughout the country. The presiding message of the NURC is: “There are no 
Hutu and Tutsi, there are only Rwandans.” Thus, in this Rwanda, citizenship is no longer based 
on ethnic identity but on Rwandanness.152  Furthermore, de-ethnicisation was understood as a 
method the government used to “re-root” identity.153 This is evident in the RPF’s management of 
both Rwandans living abroad, and Rwandans returning home. Thus, engaging with the diaspora 
was a key component of Rwanda’s nation building plan as evident through the government 
rhetoric. 
 
At the end of the post transitional period in 2003, the government prepared for the first 
presidential and parliamentary elections since the genocide. The Movement Democratique 
Republican (MDR) was effectively banned, and it was the largest Hutu opposition party and 
really the only significant Hutu voice in the Rwandan government. This banning was on the basis 
that the party spread genocidal ideology and divisionism.”154  In 2001, a law combating 
divisionism was imposed; it penalized discrimination and sectarianism. The law provides the 
following definitions of the terms: 
Discrimination is any speech, writing, or actions based on ethnicity, region or country of  
origin, the colour of the skin, physical features, sex, language, religion or ideas aimed at 
depriving a person or group of persons of their rights as provided by Rwandan law and 
by International Conventions to which Rwanda is party. 
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Sectarianism means the use of any speech, written statement or action that divides people, 
that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an uprising which might 
degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination…155 
Under this law, people who are guilty of divisionism are punished harshly and sentenced to 
prison for a period of one to twenty years.156 However, these definitions are very poorly defined 
and seemingly interchangeable. It is extremely vague as to what is meant by divisionism, which 
can be assumed to mean the same thing as discrimination and sectarianism. Human rights 
organizations like Freedom House and Amnesty International have both stated that this vague 
definition is “susceptible to manipulation and abuse.”157 Nonetheless, imparting these laws 
showed the RPF’s firm commitment to building a Rwanda narrative based on a united, identity. 
Moreover, it reaffirmed that the state building project in Rwanda post-genocide was clearly a top 
down, political process.158  
In addressing the United Nations, Kagame recently stressed the importance of national identity 
as he listed what was critical to peace building and conflict resolution, stating that “to manage 
the diversity in our societies, politics must be national in scope. Whatever differences we may 
have, our common citizenship is a bond that unites us.”159 Since the RPF came to power, this has 
been a clear part of the RPF’s national agenda. In following with the government’s aim of 
reconstructing the “Rwandan state,” the RPF likewise sought to redefine the Rwandan citizen. 
Keeping with the goal of a united Rwandan, the RPF hoped to create a “Rwandan national civic 
citizenship” that transcends ethnic categories.160 In doing so, the RPF redefined these categories 
of Rwandans, both living inside and outside the country. This process of managing and 
recategorizing citizens must be understood in the context of the state power. The RPF’s top down 
state building project is inherently politicized and is therefore linked to state power and state 
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objectives; the process of nation building thus implies that there is an author, or “agents of 
dissemination,” that is clearly linked to state power and state leadership.161  
Thus, the categorization of citizens in the diaspora reflects the RPF’s politicization of collective 
identities. The Rwandan diaspora is not homogenous, yet the government tries to categorize 
them into distinct categories, when in reality their identities are not that simple, as the following 
section will explore. The most prevalent way that the RPF wanted to build a new Rwanda was to 
recreate, reimagine, recreating identities and redefine what it meant to be a citizen. This next 
section will show the ways in which the RPF tried to do so. 
 
6.2 Top-Down Reconfiguration of Identities inside Rwanda  
 
The first official engagement with diaspora in the new Rwanda started in 1996, with the 
repatriation of Rwandans from neighboring countries, in particular the million refugees living in 
Eastern Zaire. This time the repatriation is of an entirely different nature, as it focused on the 
return of another “category” of Rwandans - “new caseload refugees” who mostly comprised of 
those who fled Rwanda right after the genocide ended. This repatriation was vastly different than 
the repatriation in the immediate aftermath of the genocide. This repatriation was forced, due to 
the security issue with continued killings in militant refugee camps occurring in neighboring 
countries.162 Ven der Meerwent, writing in 1996, warned of this process: “Under the conditions 
of post-genocide Rwanda …the emphasis on repatriation of the two million Hutu refugees 
outside Rwanda carries enormous risks of future conflict for both these countries and for the 
neighbouring states which may well become embroiled.”163 Thus, the repatriation effort from the 
government was in direct response to a security threat to the country. The Rwandan government 
estimated that by the end of 1997 approximately 800,000 new caseload refugees had returned.164 
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These “new caseload” returnees were somewhat similar to the “old caseload refugees” but in 
contrast, they faced another set of challenges. These refugees returned home to not only find 
their country in shambles but their homes occupied, belongings taken, and land claimed by 
others. Moreover, the government they returned to was hostile and suspicious, and neighbors 
were deeply traumatized. There were clear tensions between the two groups of returnees; the 
new case load refugees faced hatred and scorn from the old caseload refugees. Despite the fact 
that these returnees had been away from home for several years, the home they returned to was 
nonetheless physically, politically, socially, and culturally, a different places from what they had 
known.” 165  
This group of returnees, like their counterparts of 1994, became grouped in collective identity 
labels of “old” and “new” caseload refugees. These identities became politicized and exacerbated 
tensions. These were intergroup tensions, but also significant was the relationship between the 
refugee “groups” and the government. The new returnees were suspicious in the eyes of their 
neighbor and the government. They faced many difficulties and a great deal of discrimination on 
their return; their homes were occupied, they were suspected of being perpetrators, sympathizers, 
or collaborators. Hutu elites who returned became victims of harassment, imprisonment and 
killed under suspicious circumstances.166 
A portion of the Hutus who fled the country when the RPF seized the capital was in fact 
genocidaires and organizers of the genocide. Yet, the reality was that this group made up only 
around five percent of the 2 million Hutus who left. However, as Newbury argued: “In the eyes 
of many all these refugees were collectively held responsible, partly through the assumptions of 
“corporate ethnicity.”167  
Burnet asserted : “The shared experiences among individuals…shape distinct subject positions 
from which people view the world and negotiate their way in it.”168 This was certainly true in 
post-genocide Rwanda, and would prove to be very problematic for building a national identity 
as it became a politicized framework. There was a stark difference between how the government 
not only labels these two groups, but treats them, based on the collective identity of the groups’ 
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different lived experiences. The repatriation of the new returnees made it more evident that 
divisive identities existed in Rwanda, as the government created new categories to define the 
complex population inside the country, but it was evident that ethnicity remained an underlying 
factor.  
Mamdani critically examined the “genocide framework” from which the population was 
categorized politically, meaning that “the 1994 genocide is singled out as an event producing the 
only politically correct categories for identification and guidelines for state policy.”169 Thus there 
was a single narrative from which the government bases its policies to reconfigure the state. 
According to the state discourse, the population is divided into five categories: returnees, 
refugees, victims, survivors, and perpetrators. Returnees are mainly Tutsi (and some Hutu) exiles 
who had returned with the RPF. Refugees were divided into two groups: old caseload, who were 
mainly Tutsi refugees pregenocide, and new caseload, who were mostly Hutu post-genocide 
refugees. Despite the fact that both Tutsi and Hutu are victims, only Tutsi are identified as 
victims. They are labeled as “Tutsi genocide survivors” and only “caseload refugees.” Survivor 
is a term only applied to the Tutsi, because the genocide was aimed at Tutsi. Finally, perpetrator 
is used for only Hutus, because it is the assumption that every Hutu who opposed the genocide 
was killed, and all living Hutu are was either an active participate or passive onlooker. 
These identities were not simply labels; they had clear consequences and implications attached to 
them. For instance, because new caseload refugees were not considered victims, they were not 
entitled to any assistance for the construction of homes. These restrictive, collective, and 
stereotypical categories are problematic for many reasons. Hintjens, writing about the 
complexities of political identities in Rwanda, provides a case study of a Rwandan exile to 
illustrate this problematic concept:  
Noelle’s father was a prominent official under the former Habyarimana regime, and this 
automatically made Noelle a suspected génocidaire in present-day rural Rwanda. She is 
the only known survivor of a family of 10 and the offspring of a mixed Hutu–Tutsi 
marriage... …Noelle has been trapped between her father’s reputation as a prominent 
(though not active) official under the previous regime, and her status as a victim of rape 
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by an RPA soldier. She fears she could be silenced as a witness to war crimes in former 
Zaire, now DRC. In spite of her ‘Tutsi’ appearance, she is clear that she can not share her 
mother’s political identity as a genocide victim because of her Hutu father...The political 
identity affixed to her was of a new caseload returnee – one guilty by association of being 
active in the political opposition.170 
Thus, the labels prescribed to groups of people living in Rwanda were highly politicized and do 
not serve to accurately reflect lived identities of Rwandans. More so, this shows that the 
government clearly wanted to group people as means of control.  
 
6.3 Engaging with the Diaspora Abroad  
 
In addition to configuring Rwandan identities inside its country’s border, the RPF was also 
committed to engaging with Rwandan citizens abroad. In 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Corporation created the Diaspora General Directorate (DGD) to specifically deal with the 
diaspora.171 Its purpose was to use it to engage in diaspora “potentials” for its role in Rwanda’s 
development. The DGD’s welcome note emphasized that while national development is a 
difficult task, it is possible with a “united” and “willing” diaspora.  
These thoughts are reflected through the strategic objectives of the Diaspora General Directorate: 
 To mobilize active Rwandan diaspora for socio-economic activities of their motherland; 
 To encourage Rwandan diaspora to promote their culture and safeguard the interests and 
privileges of Rwandan expatriate abroad; 
 To mobilize the Rwandan diaspora communities abroad for a sustained and organized 
image building of their motherland; 
 To serve as a liaison between different public, private institutions in Rwanda and 
international organizations with Rwandan diaspora; 
 To mobilize expatriate and highly skilled Rwandan diaspora on knowledge and skills 
transfer to Rwanda; 
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 To create an enabling environment for financial investment and remittances, trade for 
Rwandan diaspora in Rwanda; 
 To coordinate and harmonize different initiatives and activities related to Rwandan 
diaspora in Rwanda.172  
This is evident in President Kagame’s discourse as well, who would frequently visit diaspora 
almost every time he goes abroad. In 2006, while in South Africa, Kagame addressed 500 
members at a diaspora conference, advising them to help contribute to the “advancement of their 
motherland.” Thus, he appealed to a “national consciousness.”173 Furthermore, this is evident in 
the state’s Vision 2020, which lists six pillars necessary to bring forth the plans in the vision. The 
first pillar includes goals for state engagement with the diaspora. Under the section on “Good 
Governance and a Capable State,” it lists: 
Rwanda will become a modern, united and prosperous nation founded on the positive  
values of its culture. The nation will be open to the world, including its own Diaspora. 
Rwandans will be a people, sharing the same vision for the future and ready to contribute 
to social cohesion, equity and equality of opportunity. The country is committed to being 
a capable state, characterized by the rule of law that supports and protects all its citizens 
without discrimination. The state is dedicated to the rights, unity and wellbeing of its 
people and will ensure the consolidation of the nation and its security.174  
The discourse of collective identities and labels in Rwanda go hand in hand with the 
government’s narrative of a united Rwanda. In trying to build this narrative of unity, the state 
essentially labeled the diaspora and categorized them. The discourse that is linked with the ideal 
Rwandan citizen has a clear purpose; it helps the RPF build the government’s narrative of the 
united, new, reconciled Rwanda. According to the Rwandan Diaspora Guide, the vision of 
Rwandan diaspora policies is a “united Rwandan diaspora… and point is to mobilize Rwandan 
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Diaspora for unity/cohesion among themselves.”175 Thus, there was the rhetoric was the 
collective united diaspora identity. 
6.3.1 Labeling the “Good Diaspora”  
 
In reaching out to the diaspora, the same problematic labeling of groups and creating collective 
identities is evident with the state engaging with Rwandans who have yet to return to the country. 
When the state is engaging with its diaspora, there is a clear distinction between who it is talking 
to and reaching out to. The diaspora itself has been prescribed distinct labels from the 
government.  
 It clear that there are many different “types” of citizens that fit this category of the diaspora. 
There are labels of what makes a “good diaspora” and a “problematic diaspora,” just like a “good 
citizen” and “bad citizen.” Cori Wielenga argued: “… Civic identity has the danger to further 
essentialise personal identity by creating a new category of what it means to be Rwandan that 
will yet again marginalise, hegemonise and exclude some in order to empower others.”176 This is 
very evident in Rwanda. Divisive identities transcend the narrative of unity because it was 
exclusive, as we can see in the types of labels given to citizens in and outside of Rwanda, and 
this has been evident in the discourse in Rwanda’s Diaspora Policy.  
According to the 2009 Rwanda Diaspora Policy, Rwanda diasporas are defined as “All 
Rwandans who left their country voluntarily or were forced to live in other countries of the world 
and are willing to contribute to the development of Africa. 177 Moreover, there is the “ideal 
Rwandan citizen” that is very evident in Kagame’s discourse. In a speech that Kagame made on 
Rwanda Day, a global event held to link the Rwandan government with the diaspora community, 
he urged members of the diaspora to “be a model citizen wherever you are….It’s our collective 
responsibility.”178 Thus, this rhetoric goes hand in hand with the Rwanda Diaspora Policy, which 
also states that the government strongly believes that the Rwandan diaspora can be well 
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harnessed to contribute to the country. Yet, if the Rwanda government calls upon the “model 
citizen,” who then is a ‘non-model citizen? 
The “good diaspora” is comprised of the model Rwanda citizen who is willing to contribute to 
developing Rwanda. Being a “good citizen” as part of the new Rwandan narrative had to do with 
national belonging and obligation to the state, rather than getting demands from the state.179 As a 
Rwandan editorialist observes: “The ‘model diasporan’, is not one that spends much time 
protesting outside Embassies, but one that teaches their children Kinyarwanda, remits, attends 
officially organised events, and reinforces the normality of Rwanda.”180 The Diaspora Policy 
even describes a “positive” diaspora among those who fled for political and security reasons. 
This group is described as: “Especially composed of descendents [sic] of 1959 refugees that are 
returning to Rwanda and are playing in different ways a critical role toward the national 
development in the public and private sectors.”181 
 
In contrast, the diaspora who left after 1994 are described in a different way: “It was identified 
that part of this population are grouped into armed and political subversive groups, social, 
cultural, and the so-called human rights associations while others operate as individuals to spread 
genocide ideology and sensitize other Rwandan Diaspora to go against Government’s policies 
and programmes targeting national development.”182 Thus, it was clear that a collective group 
identity was given to the “problematic” citizens of the diaspora. For Kagame, this was the 
organized opposition coming from Tutsi political groups abroad, in addition to groups who were 
still spreading genocide ideologies.183 Kagame’s discourse indicates a clear separation between a 
“good” and a “bad” diaspora. In a speech in 2000, he made the call for the return of Rwandan 
exiles: 
I am calling upon all Rwandans still in exile, whether in Africa or abroad, to return 
home…Let them come and join hands with us to build our country. I also call upon all 
the Rwandans still in the Democratic Republic of Congo and elsewhere, still harbouring 
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plans to wage war against their country, to give up, come back and join hands with us to 
build our motherland. A good number of them left this bad path, came and were returned 
to the civilian life, others were reintegrated into the various institutions of leadership, 
both in the army and the civilian life...184 
Thus, the government acknowledges this problematic diaspora. Moreover, during a global 
diaspora convention in Kigali in 2009, senior state officials Charles Karamba and Joseph 
Nzabamwita at the Rwanda Diaspora Global Convention noted that the diaspora can help the 
nation if they could “counter the activities of the Negative diaspora.”185 There has been 
numerous occasions that show the RPF has sought to manage this “negative” diaspora. For 
example, a previous ambassador to Sweden said that her task was to keep an eye on potential 
genocidaires, and a Rwandan living in Denmark said he was asked by authorities to spy on his 
fellow Rwandan countrymen in Denmark. 186 
6.3.2 Collective “Victim” and “Perpetrator” Identities  
 
While the RPF labeled the “good and bad” diaspora, it also politicized and manipulated these 
collective identities abroad and at home. Helen Hintjens uses Robin Cohen’s term victim 
diasporic nationalism to describe Rwandan nationalism, claiming that it is based on “myth of 
diasporic Tutsi victimhood.” This is based on the assumption that a social group based on some 
common origin has been victimized for a long time, and that members of the group forced into 
exile have to return, in this case to Rwanda, to reclaim their “promised land” and that “those in 
Rwanda who have victim status are allied by a common persecution, whether they were in exile 
or in Rwanda itself.”187 
The government narrative and vision is to have a united diaspora. Shindo explains how there is a 
clear dichotomy between “desirable diaspora groups and unwanted ones.”188 However, the 
implications of this coupled with those on political identities made this distinction even more 
impactful. This is because the RPF came to associate these in terms of guilt and victimhood.  
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Thus came a discourse that was very dichotomous- with the “bad” diaspora meaning the Hutu 
who fit in the “potential” perpetrator category and might spread genocide ideologies abroad.  
Mamdani argued that cycles of violence in Rwanda have been fueled by “victim 
psychologies.”189 This has been evident through Rwanda’s history, and is still pertinent in 
Rwanda “post-conflict,” as the RPF has continued to utilize and politicize their victim diaspora 
identity. The RPF’s victim discourse is evident through its continued consolidation and 
legitimization of state power, and through its use of victimhood to evade accountability for war 
crimes.   
In keeping with the national goal of rebuilding a nation based on a united citizenry, examining 
diaspora politics have provided insight into post-genocide governance based on a shared RPF 
identity of victimhood. It was not confined to the government only.  A shared sense of 
victimhood can be empowering and helpful for groups of people trying to rebuild their lives after 
a tragedy. The problem with victimhood-based identity in Rwanda is that it is an extremely 
dichotomous concept. Victim identity assumes a perpetrator identity, and this is quite troubling 
for Rwanda especially, which has had history of such bipolar group identification.  
One way was to create these identities that were meant to be unifying. However, this became 
very problematic because of this collective diaspora victim identity that the RPF had utilized to 
have collective guilt and collective victimhood as well. This is polarizing Rwanda more than it is 
bringing them together, despite the fact that the post-genocide regime claims there is a shared 
national political identity as Rwandans. But, as Hintjens concluded, the dangerous reality is that 
“victim diasporic nationalism in Rwanda is implicitly exclusive.”190  
The danger of this is that it extends these assumptions to whole groups of people.  Hintjens 
argued: “the assumption…is that a social group based on some common origin has been 
victimized for a long time, and that members of the group forced into exile have to return, in this 
case to Rwanda, to reclaim their “promised land.”191 Thus, those in Rwanda who had “victim 
status” were treated as part of a collective group of victims, whether or not they were inside the 
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country during the genocide. Thus, people who left Rwanda at certain times left under different 
circumstances, and this diasporic history came be used to collectively stigmatize groups of 
people. And, collective victimhood meant collective perpetrators.  
The RPF’s diaspora identity is problematic for one reason – members of the government saw 
themselves as victims due to its diaspora experience and therefore the legitimate power holders. 
These identities became politicized and were used to set a specific agenda on how they wanted 
the new Rwanda to be.  Hintjens argued that the RPF came to see the Hutu as dangerous and the 
ones to blame for the RPF’s exile and persecution in the first place. Hintjens warned: “This is the 
founding myth upon which Rwandan nationalism is now in danger of being based,”192 and a key 
component of that was “creating” the identity of the potential perpetrator. The RPF’s dominant 
one-party state is problematic not only because of the implications for human rights and unity, 
but because of the particular political system that it put into place, a specific vision of the future 
of the country, “a diasporan nationalism repatriated.”193   
Thus, we see that the diasporic history of Rwandans played a key role on the social context and 
psyche of the Rwandan people, and most evident in the psyche and identity and consciousness of 
the RPF. This played a major role the nation building project that the RPF embarked on, and 
struggles over legitimacy and citizenship and these identities would pervade even in the “New 
Rwanda.” 
Creating a “Perpetrator”  
 
As evident during the genocide and again in the immediate post-genocide period when the RPF 
struggled to legitimize their image as the victim group who liberated the country, victim politics 
come into play again as the RPF uses its victim identity as one way to justify their rule to fellow 
Rwandans. In addition, the RPF’s image to the outside world is very important. Yet there have 
been many concerns voiced by people inside and outside the country, speaking out against the 
seemingly dictatorial nature of the RPF since the power takeover in 1994. The RPF’s victim 
identity stemming from the diaspora remains key to understanding its reaction to these concerns. 
In order to effectively utilize a foreign policy based on victimhood and increase state power, 
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Rwanda had to be sure to effectively identify a perpetrator, enemy, or threat to substantiate its 
victim based identity.  
For Rwanda, this threat has changed over the years. In the transition period, the threat represents 
itself in the form of anti-Tutsi militias in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo. This was 
quite clear cut perpetrator, as active killings continued for years at the borders. The eight years of 
transition from 1994 to 2002 were marked by a situation of almost permanent war, due to the 
ongoing military threat from armed Hutu groups based in the region and the countries that 
backed them. This situation had a negative impact on the planned process of political reform, and 
most of all on political liberties. While international actors previously thought the government 
was party justified because of internal security, it became clear that the government needed to 
politically liberalize.194  
 
In more recent years, the potential perpetrator became more convoluted and contested. In the 
absence of an active oppressor, diaspora communities may feel that they have lost the main 
identifier of their cause and thus lose legitimacy in the eyes of the state.195 Thus, “potential 
perpetrator” to Rwanda became anything that threatens national reconciliation. For the diaspora, 
this means that it became closely managed and controlled.  
 
Unfortunately this is also coming in the form of attacking exiles who are speaking out. They are 
seen as “threats” because they may “spread genocide ideologies.” Furthermore, this is 
problematic with an announcement from the UNHCR that refugee status of all Rwandans who 
fled the country between 1959 and December 1998 will cease in June 2013. Rwandan officials 
insist that it is peaceful and safe and that there is no reason for refugees to remain outside the 
country.196  Despite this claim from the government, continued attacks are causing a lot of fear 
and uncertainty for members of the Diaspora to return home to Rwanda.197 In conclusion, 
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politicizing the victimhood identity does several things for RPF: justifies their policies, 
legitimizes their power, and create a whole new category of the “unideal Rwandan citizen,” or 
the “threat” to the country. 
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Chapter 7: Building the State Narrative 
 
This chapter explores another way in which the Rwandan government has sought to reinvent the 
ideal Rwandan citizen by changing perceptions of the government. They propagated a specific 
picture they wanted to show through discourse as well as formalized education, or “reeducation” 
programs. This chapter analyzes these two ways.  Both of these methods include the diaspora; 
the government engaged with its diaspora to disseminate this information. 
7.1 Managing Perceptions and Knowledge  
 
A final way to explore how the state has managed and recreated the Rwandan citizen is through 
its narrative building through discourse and its reeducation programs, aimed at both returning 
diaspora members and those still abroad. Knowledge is a key part of creating citizens in Rwanda. 
This has a clear historical precedent in the context of Rwanda. As Mamdani noted: “the founding 
ideology of Tutsi Power in post-genocide Rwanda is the memory of the genocide and the moral 
manipulation never to let it happen again.”198 The genocide framework was still very much 
relevant in the minds of the government.  Thus, the government acknowledged the importance of 
rebuilding a narrative that was vastly different than the genocide framework.  
As the 2007 Reconciliation Policy states, unity and reconciliation “requires every citizen to 
change their mind completely.”199 Therefore, it was necessary for citizens to have a mindset that 
was fitting to the Rwanda narrative. Civic duty, a shared history, and nationalistic pride were 
components of the ideal Rwandan citizen, and government sanctioned reeducation programs 
highlighted these vital themes. As Turner shows, these programs were aimed at “making good 
citizens,” that is, transforming the “bad life” into a good one.200 
Ensuring that citizens have “correct” thoughts is one aspect of creating the ideal citizen. This 
narrative exists to dictate what ideologies and schemas are allowed inside Rwanda. This chapter 
argues that these programs were put in place to combat the perceptions of the RPF that were not 
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aligned with the narrative it wanted to espouse. Thus, through the state-controlled programs, the 
RPF sought to produce a specific narrative to help reconcile the nation and overcome divisive 
identities. 
I argue that this is a very carefully crafted narrative that is significant because it targets people 
both inside and outside the country. Moreover, the programs promote nationalism and paint a 
very clear picture of what the “ideal citizen” should be. Most importantly, these citizens have to 
fit the vision of the state. For example, a government publication entitled “All you need to know 
about Rwanda” noted the following: “Many people who had the chance to visit Rwanda have 
been…intrigued by the fact that Rwandans are harmoniously living together only 10 years after 
the Genocide…Today, not only are Rwandans living together but they share the common 
aspirations as one people, as it used to be.”201 Purdekova questions this political governance on 
rhetoric, saying, “Is this really all we need to know, or should it rather be the point of departure 
in our ‘project of knowing’?”202 Thus, the government rhetoric must be taken with some scrutiny 
and understood in the context of their narrative. 
 
7.2 A Call to the Diaspora to Return Home  
 
7.2.1 Welcoming the Diaspora Home to a United Rwanda  
 
Newbury explained: “We cannot understand the particular nature of “coming home,” therefore 
without understanding the nature of the actor’s relationships to political power, to the state.”203 
This time, the government’s engagement with the diaspora was very different from the forced 
repatriation of 1996. Instead, the government formalized its approach and actively sought out the 
members of the diaspora to return home. Engaging with the diaspora became one of its priorities; 
the RPF sought to rebuild a nation and rebuild its citizenry as well. Thus the government 
welcomed home Rwandans from abroad, inviting members from all over the diaspora to come 
home and help rebuild their country. Many of them have lived abroad for some years. This 
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message is clearly in line with the government’s nation building rhetoric; it was a message 
appealing to the desire for national unity, and a call for Rwandans to have a common goal.204 
Government discourse, policies, programs, and laws all reflected this objective. Overall, 
approximately 2.1-3.4 million Hutu and Tutsi refugees have returned since 1994. This is the 
largest recorded repatriation in the world. 205 The UNHCR has been aiding this; since the end of 
2002 the UNHCR and other African countries signed agreements to guarantee “voluntary, safe 
and dignified return.”206 
Through interviews with Rwandans, Wielenga revealed the diverse attitudes of Rwandans and 
the immense tensions that still existed during this transition. Many who returned did so because 
they believed in the RPF’s message and wanted to go home. As one returnee stressed in an 
interview, those who are abroad need to come home so they can work through the issues that 
remain in the reconciliation process, even though it is not easy for young Hutu. Furthermore, he 
said that fears from people living outside the country are unfounded, and that they need to see 
how the country has progressed through the years.207  
 
This of course was not an opinion held by everyone. Another repatriated Rwandan Hutu 
expressed how the government does not allow anyone to speak of the RPF’s crimes or those who 
have lost family because of the RPF: “If there is no fear in Rwanda, why are we not hearing their 
stories?”208 Thus, the perceptions of Rwandan Hutus who returned from the diaspora were varied.  
Moreover, the political repression of the RPF led to many Rwandans choosing to leave the 
country; the press, organizations, and opposition parties were silenced. Fearing for their lives, 
many chose to join other exile opponents outside the country.209  
 
There still remained uncertainties and fears for some members of the diaspora. Refugees 
expressed concerns about human rights abuses of the Rwandan government. And, they did not 
have full confidence in Rwanda’s criminal justice system.210 In 2001, around 55,000 Rwandans 
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still remained in neighboring countries, and inside the country Rwandans were leaving the 
country. This was an indicator that the government’s narrative of reconciliation was not as 
realized as it would like, and it showed that the government was not inspiring the confidence of 
its own people.211 Thus, the diaspora had a utilitarian role for Rwanda because it helped combat 
the propaganda abroad. 
 
While it is evident that the RPF was committed to engaging with the diaspora, it is also clear that 
there’s a motive; to utilize the diaspora. And, while this engagement with the diaspora seemed to 
be inclusive, it was quite problematic as it reified group identity in Rwanda. This was in line 
with the message the government wanted to give: that Rwanda can hold all people, has enough 
resources, is safe, and that everyone is welcome to come back. 
Therefore, the diaspora played a second role. The “uncertain” and non-confident diaspora 
members were also a target of the government; the government wanted to show those who were 
unwilling to return that there was nothing to be afraid of. The Rwandan government utilized the 
diaspora because it would help them legitimize their regime and show that Rwanda is in fact a 
“new Rwanda” that is no longer divided.  
In response to the concerns voiced and the tense political climate at home, Kagame called for a 
National Summit on Reconciliation and Unity in 2000. One of its aims was to encourage 
Rwandans to return to their homeland.212 Intended as a forum for debate, Rwandans voiced their 
opinions. One Rwandan who lived in the Congo posed the question: How can Rwandans willing 
to return home trust the Government of Rwanda when there are many jailed Rwandans and 
others are on the wanted list?213 The Commissioner General of Police responded that it is a 
“trust-building factor,” and furthermore, “Rwandans will trust their country when they realize 
that they are all equally protected by the laws of the country.” Other Rwandans who represented 
the diaspora in Southern African voiced: 
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We request the Repatriation Commission and the Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
to visit the Diaspora more often, and tell them the truth about what is happening back 
home, so  that they can get out of their isolation. Thus, anyone willing to return 
home can feel free to come. And those choosing to remain abroad should be fed with 
accurate information as to what obtains back home.214 
The response to this request was quite interesting: 
Rwandans of the diaspora are requested to join in and contribute their part in the process  
of negotiating a soft exit from the Transition. They are especially requested to convey the 
correct picture of Rwanda in their countries of residence; they should try as much as they 
can to prop up Rwanda's image abroad.215 
This indicates several things. First, the narrative of Rwanda is still unclear. Furthermore, 
concerns remain. Thus, the government needed the diaspora to be the government’s 
spokesperson and dispel “myths” about the Rwandan narrative. Moreover, it became part of the 
government’s strategy to appeal to a suspicious international community, showing them that 
their country is ready and willing to welcome their citizens back home. At the same 
Reconciliation Summit, Kagame made this claim: 
Those Rwandans who chose to run away to foreign countries and deceive the 
international community do a disservice to their motherland and their fellow countrymen 
and women. Some of them may have committed crimes, while others are driven by their 
selfish interests; yet others are guided by outmoded and backward ideas based on 
divisionism and ethnicity. But as we have often stated, every Munyarwanda who would 
like to come back to their homeland is most welcome.216 
Thus, the government engaged with the diaspora in a more programmatic way through diaspora 
return programs, which have come to play an important role in the state’s nation building script. 
Kagame has scheduled multiple meetings with diaspora groups across the world in order to 
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reassure them of their safety and encouraged individuals to “come and see” the country, bringing 
in Rwandans from all over the world and showing the “new Rwanda.”217 
The “Come and See, Go and Tell” programs started in 2010 when Kagame met the diaspora in 
Belgium. Because people were skeptical of Rwanda’s stance, he promise that they could “come 
and see” the country for themselves and see what has been happening in Rwanda since 1994. He 
promised that the government would pay all costs for 100 people to visit the country. The only 
criterion to be eligible was that they had not been in Rwanda for at least 15 years. During their 
stay in the country, members of the diaspora attend meetings where government officials 
presented them with “credible information” about Rwanda.218  
This program is an example of how the RPF has dealt with the “problematic” members of the 
diaspora who espouse perceptions contrary to what the government claims. Moreover, asking 
members to return to the country aids in spreading the image of what the state wants to build. 
Nonetheless, skeptics have acknowledged that this could be a carefully staged performance of 
the state.219  
 
7.2.2 The Role of the Diaspora in Building the Narrative of a Reconciled Rwanda  
 
Information disseminated through media and government publications all have this narrative as 
well, the narrative of success. One news article described the success of the program:  
What most of them said is that they are going to say and explain exactly what they saw in 
Rwanda to their fellows especially where Rwanda has reached in development. They 
thanked the government of Rwanda for initiating ‘Come and See, Go and Tell’ program 
which make people know exactly the truth about what is happening in Rwanda which is 
contrary to the rumours they heard.”220 
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In 2014, the government published a report entitled “Repatriation and Reintegration Programs 
for Rwanda Refugees.”221 It spoke of different success stories that Rwandans returning from the 
diaspora had. One Rwandan returnee described:  
Concerning democracy there is a positive and great transformation in the Government of 
Rwanda's policy which allows opposition political parties to do lawfully their political 
activities. Hon. Commissioner, I found my home country, Rwanda safe, peaceful and 
secured. I was satisfied that I do not have any fear of living there. Therefore, I do not find 
any reason for Rwandans to continue to be called refugees. Thus I decide to abandon 
refugee's life to go back to my home country. 
This was an official report from the government, which failed to mention anything whatsoever 
about the immense challenges that returnees would definitely have. Instead, the narrative was 
that it was a positive and successful life change.  
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7.3 Creating the Ideal Citizen Through Reeducation 
 
Hintjens argued: “Citizenship is presented not as an organic quality, but as something that must 
be built and inculcated through the right education, ideology and practices.”222 The RPF has 
made it clear that rebuilding ideologies played a crucial role in state building, particularly in 
fighting divisive roles. It sought a more practical approach to nation building by implementing 
education camps aimed at “reeducating” the Rwandan citizenry.  
 
7.3.1 Ingando Civic Camps 
 
These Ingando camps were put in place in 1996 and they have been called various things, such as  
‘solidarity camps’, ‘re-education’ camps, ‘civic education’ camps, ‘political awareness’ camps, 
‘reorientation’ camps, and ‘reintegration’ courses. They were non-voluntary and lasted around 
three to eight weeks long, and included several hundred participants. 
Most importantly, they were taught reconciliatory practices. Participants had to come together to 
discuss “problems of national concern.”223 The government’s objectives with these programs 
were to achieve “lasting harmony” among Rwandans. Ingando camps are especially interesting 
in the context of analyzing RPF politics, as they provide a way to see what populations the 
government targets and believes is most in need of “reeducation.”224 Originally, the camps were 
targeted toward returning Tutsi who had spent years living outside Rwanda. But, it actually came 
to include many different groups in the community, including “old caseload” and “new caseload” 
returnees, ex-FAR soldiers and demobilized rebels, provisionally released prisoners, sex workers 
and, most recently, pre-university students on government scholarships, teachers, youth groups, 
and civil servants.  
Interestingly, it was evident there was a clearly different focus depending on the group. For the 
old caseload returnees, the focus was to primarily promote a sense of unity. In contrast, for new 
case load refugees, education was focused on stopping divisive ideologies and genocide 
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mentalities. As one government official remarked: “Remember also that you are former Hutu we 
are all Rwandans now and this is the basis of our history lessons.”225 According to Human Rights 
Watch, these camps for new case load refugees were meant to “promote ideas of nationalism, 
erase ethnically-charged lessons of the previous government and spur loyalty to the RPF.”226 
However, the nature of these camps was questionable. They were described as having military-
like discipline; one participant remarked “men around me said it was no better than prison.”227 
 
7.3.2 “Itorero” Civic Education  
 
Another program specifically targets Rwandans living abroad in the diaspora. In keeping with 
the Rwandan narrative of unity, these programs specifically targeted Rwandans living abroad, to 
reeducate them and mobilize them. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperated recommend 
that those in the diaspora attend “Itorero,” which according to the Diaspora General Directorate 
is: “Rwandan civic education institution which aims mainly to teach all Rwandese to keep their 
culture through its different values for their unity and patriotism…”228 The National Itorero 
Commission lists that its first mission is to train Rwandans to: “make them understand their 
shared values and taboos in their coexistence, be patriotic and contribute to national 
development.”229  
Dr. Celestin Ntivuguruzwa, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Education, said: “They 
have different ideas that are taken into consideration for the development of the country. The 
lessons they will learn include Rwanda’s history, Rwandan values, the culture of self-reliance 
and patriotism.”230 
In reaching out beyond Rwanda’s state borders to engage with Rwandans abroad, the 
government was committed to spreading ideals of unity, patriotism, and civil duty. Furthermore, 
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Francis Kaboneka, the Minister for Local Governance, remarked in the programs that “many 
Genocide perpetrators were professionals but they lacked the most important things: norms and 
values.”231 With this remark, two things are evident: the government still alludes to the genocide 
framework when discussing “problematic” citizens; and that the way to combat this was through 
instilling a “certain type of education.”232 
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Chapter 8: Falling Short of a United, Reconciled Rwanda  
 
What can we conclude from an assessment of identity politics, nation building, and diaspora 
polices in post-genocide Rwanda?  This final chapter problematizes the RPF’s engagement with 
the diaspora as part of its nation building narrative. This chapter argues that the way in which the 
government has collectively grouped identities in Rwanda, politicized these identities, and have 
significant and problematic implications. While there are claims from the government that 
Rwanda is a united a reconciled post-conflict state, there remains challenges that the government 
must address if it truly wants to transcend divisive identities. This chapter provides a critical 
analysis of the RPF’s political motives and implications of these policies. This chapter serves as 
a critical discussion of some of the most pertinent implications of the role of identity politics in 
Rwanda’s nation building, such as the problems associated with an increased restrictive political 
space and strict management of identities. This chapter will examine this in three themes: 
moving beyond identity and genocide framework; governance and political space; and finally, 
reconciliation.  
8.1 Silenced Narratives: Between Collective Identities and Lived Identities  
 
8.1.1 Restrictive Identities   
 
The government has tried to manage identities of Rwandans inside and outside the country by 
prescribing labels, redefining what it means to be a “good citizen,” and punishing those 
considered to be a “bad citizen.” In Rwanda, there is now a very strict narrow definition of what 
identities are “allowed” to exist in public spaces; being “Rwandan” is now the only politically 
correct identity. In an effort to build a national common identity of unity and reconciliation, this 
thesis has shown how the RPF has recreated and reimaged collective identities in Rwanda. These 
identities are part of an explicit top-down narrative that reinforces essentialist thinking. This 
narrative provokes images of a united Rwanda with a common people with share ideologies and 
goals. 
However, this single identity cannot adequately reflect the diverse experiences of Rwandans in 
and outside the country. Moreover, “a general cultural identity as ‘Rwandan’ did not always 
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facilitate political integration into Rwanda, nor did it always address the particular process of 
“coming home,” as Newbury pointed out.233 Instead, these identities are restrictive and are not 
reflective of the complex identities of Rwandans, based on an array of things like lived 
experiences, and other cross-sectional identities (ie. gender, class).  
In Rwanda, there exists a very strict and narrow definition of which identities are “allowed” to 
exist in public spaces; being ‘Rwanda” is now the only politically correct identity. The new 
single identity - “Rwandan” - and the narrative of unity has sought to simply replace difference 
“silenced” identities and perceptions rather than reconciling them in a meaningful way. The 
labels are too simplistic and can be misleading. For example, the term “old caseload returnees” 
does not reflect what the politicized label attached to it permits. There are immensely different 
experiences of people labeled as “old caseload.” Those who returned from Uganda mostly held 
high positions when they returned to Rwanda, in government or civil society. Alternatively, Tutsi 
who returned from Tanzania, Zaire, and Burundi often felt more marginalized as to the position 
the “received” in society. Among other reasons, in the eyes of the government, these “groups” of 
Tutsi seemed to be categorically different from their Anglophone counterparts as Francophone 
speakers. Additionally, they were viewed as not having contributed to the liberation of Rwanda 
in 1994, unlike the heroic Tutsis from Uganda.234 Thus, this is just one illustration of how much 
more complex and problematic these labels are.  
 
Until the identity issues and attitudes at the heart of the conflict are addressed and deconstructed 
in a meaningful way, these divisive identities may continue to be politicized and utilized. Thus, 
there is no homogenous and simplistic “old caseload returnee” category, just as much as there is 
no homogenous Tutsi category. Likewise, Gourevitch described that the historically ethnic state 
created a world of just “us and them” but the reality was quite different. Instead, it was: 
   …An elaborate grid of subcategories lay just beneath the surface. There were Hutus with  
  good records, and suspect Hutus, Hutus in exile and displaced Hutus, Hutus who wanted  
  to work with the RPF, and anti-Power Hutus who were also anti RPF…..” 235 
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Thus, intergroup tensions, different perceptions, commonalties, and shared experiences, all 
existed beyond these categories.236  
 
However, despite the government narrative, different identities are still relevant and exist outside 
the government discourse. They go beyond a simple ethnic dichotomy. Purdekova argued that 
after the genocide, “although these categories are banned from public discourse, they survive as 
identifications in private, and they continue to structure day-to-day lives. It can be said that the 
act of genocide and its memory have strengthened the boundaries and the self-identification on 
either side of the divide even as ethnic categories have disappeared from identity cards and 
official social and political engineering.”237 This shows that identities cannot be reconstructed 
that easily, despite massive efforts from the government. Instead, there continues to be a 
polarizing discourse that groups people together arbitrarily, and based on political motive. There 
is now a narrative in Rwanda that is just as exclusionary as it is inclusionary.238 
 
8.1.2 Managing Identities in a Tightened Political Space  
 
The context of these silenced and restrictive identities must be situated in the context of state 
power. The government wanted to construct a narrative of Rwandan society that is manageable, 
yet the diaspora poses a threat to that. However, the government also acknowledged the role that 
the diaspora could play in building the state narrative. Unfortunately this has real repercussions, 
as identities in post-genocide Rwanda have been continued to be politicized. In general, 
politicized identities will be generally problematic. As Hintjens describes:  “Identity politics 
became a means of legitimizing collective violence and scapegoating, and a knife in the back of 
the civilian population as a whole, victims and victimizers alike.”239  
This is not a new concept. In such a historically divisive country based on ethnic difference, the 
government has manipulated identity for state gains. For example, as one scholar put it, “from 
1973 to 1994, President Juvénal Habyarimana emphasized his conception of the “true” Rwandan 
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identity, which was someone who engaged in agricultural production and promotes welfare of 
the state and his community.”240 At the time, this narrative reflected what Habyarimana 
prioritized, which was agriculturally developing the state. Therefore, defining who a Rwandan is 
became a politicized action depending on what the current state wants. This is problematic 
because it suggests that state power in Rwanda thinks that it can reconstruct identities to result in 
a certain type of identity and category of citizenship.  
Furthermore, Wielenga argues that these categories are problematic because they “[have] the 
danger to further essentialise personal identity by creating a new category of what it means to be 
Rwandan that will yet again marginalise, hegemonise and exclude some in order to empower 
others.”241 Thus, “instead of successfully transcending ethnic divisions, the government policy of 
denying ethnicity seems to have exacerbated the divisions. This is in spite of attempts to 
introduce robust citizenship discourse.”242  
 
What role does the state engagement with the diaspora have in this narrative? As one Rwandan 
living in exile stated: ‘The Rwandan government cannot rest easy as long as it is aware that there 
are still Rwandans in exile beyond its control.”243The narrative of security and unity was very 
important in the post-genocide efforts. These efforts to nation build and fight genocidal 
ideologies abroad were seen as necessary for a state rebuilding from such extremely delicate and 
tense social climate. Unity and reconciliation was necessary and the programs put in place were a 
great start. However, gradually, as the RPF consolidated state control, the tightened political 
space proved to be problematic, as there seemed to be more indication that the RPF sought to 
manage control of the country, under the guise of security and reconciliation. This is evident in 
the way it has sought to control political space abroad as well.  
 
In 2006, President Kagame made a speech at a North American Rwanda Convention in the 
United States, where he criticized self-exiled politics, saying that Rwanda has built a political 
system that is backed by the Constitution. He stated that was no reason that would stop someone 
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from forming a political party, and that the government believes in power sharing.”244 However, 
to what extent is this statement true? There seems to be a disconnect between reality and the 
government discourse. Human rights organizations, scholars, journalists, and Rwanda exiles 
abroad tell a different narrative. Rwanda has been repeatedly accused of violated human rights 
and denying free speech in order to maintain their narrative of unity. The government has a much 
lesser degree of control over people in the diaspora, thus members of the diaspora threaten the 
state’s sovereign power.  
 
8.2 Challenges for Reconciliation 
 
There is no doubt that identity politics remain salient in Rwandan politics. Thus, challenges 
remain for the post-genocide state, in terms of achieving “reconciliation” as part of the 
transitional justice process. Susan Thompson paints a clear picture of the tensions and 
problematic notions of the prospect for reconciliation in Rwanda: 
The official position is that reconciliation between these two groups is ongoing and  
 successful—Rwanda is both peaceful and safe. Survivors can speak of their experiences 
in sanctioned settings, such as during the April mourning period or at the gacaca justice 
trials. Perpetrators can hang their head in shame and ask for forgiveness once they have 
told the truth about what they did. It is these two narrow and essentialist categories of 
“survivor” and “perpetrator” that are the protagonist of national unity and reconciliation, 
to the exclusion of other actors and experiences of violence.245 
This example shows that despite the government narrative, real lived experiences, as this thesis 
has explored, are in reality much different.  
Mamdani said: “If the Hutu demand democracy, a recognition that they are the political majority, 
the Tutsi demand justice, a claim that the right to life must precede any recognition of a political 
majority. Is it possible to reconcile these seemingly conflicting demands: democracy and 
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justice…? Without the notion of justice appropriate to a postgenocide situation, it will not be 
possible to construct a political identity other than Hutu and Tutsi in postgenocide Rwanda.”246 
Justice, therefore, is a key theme in reconciliatory efforts, as part of the transitional justice 
process when a country experiences devastating and traumatic violence. Yet, collective political 
identities remain salient in Rwanda, and that is a major hindrance to reconciliation in Rwanda. 
The RPF’s narrative of the genocide and its rebuilding is loaded with assumptions based on 
political identities.  
In Rwanda, this is problematic. Having collective identities in Rwanda has big implication 
because there is collective Hutu guilt. There will not be true reconciliation if crimes on both 
sides are not addressed. There have been little transitional justice mechanisms put in place to 
address the RPF war crimes during 1994, including reprisal killings, as well as the alleged 
massacres in eastern Zaire from 1996  - 1997. Many have called for bringing the RPF to justice 
for their alleged war crimes. Without reconciling the needs for justice, that go beyond the 
government labels, the Rwandan society may exacerbate feelings of resentment and distrust.247 
In transition justice mechanisms in Rwanda, divisive collectives and politicized identities are 
relevant too. President Kagame expressed that “there can be no durable reconciliation as long as 
those who are responsible for the massacres in Rwanda are not properly tried.” However, it is 
clear that justice, for the RPF, was only prescribed to certain groups in Rwanda.248 Collective 
guilt is very clear in the Rwandan discourse, and it goes along with the notion of the RPF’s 
collective victimhood.  Kagame had addressed Hutu children as recent as 2013 and told them to 
apologize for their parents’ actions.249 This has very problematic implications for trying to 
overcome group-identity based politics in Rwanda. As Mamdani stated: “there can be no 
reconciliation without a reorganization of power.”250 In the case of Rwanda, power politics 
coupled with identity politics clearly challenge Rwandan’s prospect for reconciliation.   
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Conclusion: Transcending Divisive Identities?  
 
Twenty years after the end of genocide, Phil Clark reflects: “foreign leaders and journalists who 
descend on Rwanda this year will find a country that, under the leadership of President Paul 
Kagame, has recorded enormous gains since the genocide in terms of rebuilding infrastructure, 
socioeconomic development, gender equality, accountability  for genocide perpetrators, and the 
integration of former combatants.”251 This has been attested to Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, who’s leadership has made important strides toward reconciliation and rebuilding a 
narrative of a unified Rwandan identity. Indicators on poverty, health and the economy continue 
to move in the right direction.252 However, the reality is that divisive identities in Rwanda, more 
than two decades after the end of the genocide, still remain. “The root cause of ethnic violence 
(in 1994 as in 1959), must be found in the extent to which collective identities have been 
reactivated, mythologized and manipulated for political advantage.”  Rene Lemarchand 
expressed this sentiment in 1994, but these identities are still vastly present and salient in the 
post-genocide period, and are still problematic.  
This case study aimed to analyze the problems with identities, in the context of post-genocide 
Rwanda nation building. The central question raised in this thesis was: In what ways, and to 
what extent, have identity politics affected the nation building project in post-genocide Rwanda, 
in relation to its diaspora?  
Rwanda’s turbulent history raises many issues with the political and social construction of 
Rwandan identity. Yet, scholarship on Rwanda’s post-genocide dynamics has not substantially 
examined the role of the diaspora, nor the state’s engagement with its diaspora. This thesis 
sought to examine these dynamics. It did so by examining: (1) the ways in which the RPF 
reconfigured identities inside Rwanda by perpetuating the narrative of unity; (2) the collective 
identities ascribed to groups of citizens inside and outside Rwanda, based on this government 
narrative; (3) how the RPF governed perceptions abroad; and finally (4) the education programs 
to shape the idea Rwandan citizen.  
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How successful was the RPF in nation building and overcoming divisive identities? While there 
is no way of truly answering this, there are clear indicators that give insight into the state of 
governance.  Through this critical analysis, I draw certain conclusions. The Rwandan 
government, in trying to rebuild the nation, has failed to transcend divisive identities that have 
pervaded in Rwanda. Instead, it has created a tightly controlled political space in which a 
restrictive single identity and narrative existed. The state’s engagement with its diaspora helps 
illustrate this.  
The RPF’s engagement with the diaspora during the transitional and post transition period is 
reflective of the political nature of post-genocide Rwanda. Despite the efforts of the RPF to 
create a new Rwanda in which divisive identities are no longer salient, identity-laden politics 
remain key in Rwandan politics. Identities are complex and ever-changing with the political 
landscape, and thus are not as simplistic as a Tutsi –Hutu divide. Instead, identities linked with 
citizenship and victimhood, histories of mobility, and lived experiences.  
This thesis contributes to a growing body of literature on diaspora and it role in rebuilding post 
conflict states. While the Rwandan case study may seem unique due to the scale of extreme 
violence, examining this case study provides a comprehensive yet nuanced look at identity 
politics for countries that are trying to rebuild and has historically deep divisions and an 
overwhelming need to reconcile. While the future role of the Rwandan diaspora remains 
uncertain, one thing is clear: identities must be understood in a framework that goes well beyond 
its national borders.  
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